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NOTES
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND
POLLUTANT INJURIES: THE NEED FOR
A CONTEMPORARY LEGAL RESPONSE TO
CONTEMPORARY TECHNOLOGICAL FAILURE
Most Americans had no idea, until relatively recently, that they
were living so dangerously. They had no idea that when they
went to work in the morning, or when they ate their breakfast
...that when they did things as ordinary, as innocent and as
essential to life as eat, drink, breathe or touch they could, in
fact, be laying their lives on the line.1
Technology has played an unmistakably instrumental role in
the growth of modem civilization. For three centuries science and

technology "had an unblemished and justified reputation as a wonderful adventure, pouring out practical benefits and liberating
spirit from the errors of superstition and traditional faith." 2 We

now recognize, however, that the benefits of sophisticated technology carry with them inherent and often unrecognized burdens on

public health and environmental safety. 3 Of recent national concern have been the immediate and long-term problems attributable
to improper hazardous-waste disposal. 4 Particularly alarming is the
1. 122 CONG. REC. 5015 (1976) (remarks of Russell Train, Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency).
2.

P. GOODMAN, NEW REFORMATION 6 (1970).

3. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH
CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic

SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY AND TEXAS, (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as SIX CASE STUDIES]; Estep,

Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1960); Kraus, Environmental Carcinogenosis:Regulation

on the Frontiersof Science, 7 ENVT'L L. 83 (1976); Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action
for Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 17
(1966).
4. See, e.g., SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 3; Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal
Hearings]; NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON HAZARDOUS WASTES (Hearing Officer's Report 1979) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; Knight, Toxic Wastes Hurriedly Dumped Be-
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great proliferation of synthetic chemicals and substances generated
as a consequence of technological advancement. This has produced
a type of pollution against which few, if any, effective preventive
measures can be taken. 5
The legacy of improper hazardous- and toxic-waste disposal is
already evident. Property damage, contaminated water, fish con-

tamination, maladorous fumes, air pollution, income losses due to
interference with industry, and acute personal injuries such as ele-

vated blood levels, miscarriages, birth defects, asthma, nervous
disorders, and urinary disease are some of a litany of effects linked

to hazardous and toxic substances. 6 More staggering are the prospects of latent or progressive injuries whose symptoms may first

7
become ascertainable long after exposure to toxic substances.
Damages for injuries attibutable to environmental contamination
may be sought under a gamut of common law doctrines such as
trespass, nuisance, or negligence, depending upon the facts of a
particular case. 8 In the final analysis, however, liability is often

predetermined by statutes of limitations. At hearings held in May
1979, New York Congressman John J. LaFalce described the potential problems limitations periods may pose in hazardous- and
toxic-waste-disposal controversies:
We have great difficulties with the law right now, because very
often you don't find out about the fact that you are injured until
maybe 25 years after someone has committed an act-maybe a
negligent act, maybe not a negligent act .... How do you overcome the hurdle of the statute of limitations, which says that you
have 2 or 3 years, or 4 years, depending upon the legal theory,
from the act that caused the injury to bring your lawsuit, when
you find out about it 25 or 35 years later? And should you put a

fore New Law Goes Into Effect, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 5; Marcus,
Toxic Waste: A Legal Mess, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 10, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
5. Kraus, supra note 3, at 84.
6. See, e.g., SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 26, 31, 35, 47, 55-56 (property
damage); id. at 20, 26, 29, 47, 61, 140, 143-44, 214, 339-40 (contaminated water); id.
at 31, 74 (fish contamination); id. at 404, 407-12 (air pollution); id. at 16, 17, 30, 31,
55-56, 74, 214, 288 (income losses due to interference with industry); id. at 222, 282,
339, 344 (malodorous fumes); id. at 51 (elevated blood levels); id. at 43 (miscarriages
and birth defects); Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings,supra note 4, Pt.
2, at 62, 76 (asthma); id. at 62, 74 (nervous disorders); id. at 62, 76 (urinary disease).
7. Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 17, 20, 26, 29, 39, 43, 47, 51, 55, 72, 152,
224, 291, 355, 415-17; Kraus, supra note 3, at 94-97.
8. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 3 at 477-83; Baurer, Love Canal: Common
Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVT'L L. 133, 137-46 (1980).
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person through the torture of the traditional legal process when
you are dealing with a totally untraditional difficulty? Clearly
not.9
This Note examines the issue of statutes of limitations in
environmental-contamination suits and illustrates that these statutes may pose significant and sometimes insurmountable obstacles
to recovery in hazardous- and toxic-waste-disposal cases where private parties seek compensation for latent or progressive personal
injuries. Examination of the policies underlying statutes of limitations in general and specific analysis of their operation in New
York, New Jersey, and California, where hazardous and toxic
wastes have taken a considerable toll upon the environment, demonstrates the pressing need for judicial interpretation or, preferably, legislative amendment of personal injury statutes of limitations, so that victims of latent or progressive pollutant injuries will
not be foreclosed from recovery automatically or arbitrarily.
This Note first undertakes a brief historical overview of the
emergence of statutes of limitations, their underlying purposes,
and their operational systems. The subsequent section discusses
pollution incidents in New York, California, and New Jersey, and
projects how the limitations laws of these states will apply to
hazardous- and toxic-waste-disposal controversies where latent or
progressive injuries are alleged.' 0 The final section proposes a reform to resolve the illogical inconsistencies currently bred by varying personal injury statutes of limitations.
HISTORICAL OVERvIEW: THE Hows
AND WHYS OF OPERATION

The major rationale for statutes of limitations"

is the belief

9. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings,supra note 4, Pt. 2, at 10 (remarks of Rep. LaFalce).
10. It also briefly examines the amendment the New York Legislature recently

considered to remedy this problem. See notes 111-117 infra and accompanying text.
11. For a comprehensive study of statutes of limitations, see Developments in
the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177 (1950). This background

section relies heavily on that work.
Prior to the Limitations Act of 1623, Limitation Act, 1623, 21 JACI, c.16, the
common law recognized rights in contract and tort as perpetual. Labyrinthine procedural requirements reduced the likelihood of suits untimely filed, and only when
more convenient forms of action emerged did the need for limitations pierce the
common law judicial system. Id. at 1177-78. The Limitations Act of 1623 established
different limitations periods for different forms of action. Most early American state

legislatures adopted this common law statute of limitations with only slight varia-
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that at some point defendants should be secure in the knowledge
that they will not be haunted by stale claims. 12 In addition, statutes of limitations protect defendants against evidentiary problems-such as lost records and unavailable witnesses' 3-caused
by long-delayed litigation, and promote judicial economy.14
Historically, limitations periods governing personal-injury claims
have been shorter than those in other civil actions, 15 possibly because personal-injury litigation poses special evidentiary problems. 16 If the period between the time of injury and litigation is
relatively short, there is less risk of spurious claims and inaccurate
17
evidence.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and the
burdens of pleading and proving its application normally fall upon
the defendant.' Where a plaintiff seeks to invoke a legislatively or
judicially recognized exception to the statutory bar, however, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff who then assumes the risk of nonpersuasion.19

In cases where the statute of limitations is invoked as a detions in the periods prescribed. Id. at 1192. By 1849, however, legislatures began to
fashion their own statutes of limitation upon the types of liability (e.g, liability
arising out of contract or created by statute) or injury involved.
New York was the first to revise the statute of limitations when it abolished
forms of action and adopted code pleading. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF PROCEDURE §
91-93 (Bliss 1877) (enacted in 1849).
Subsequently, several states modeled their limitations laws after those of New
York. See, e.g., Minn. Rev. Stat. (Terr.) c.70, §§ 6, 8 (1851). Currently every state has
its own statutes of limitations governing when the majority of actions may be
brought. See Developments in the Law, supra, at 1179.
12. Developments in the Law, supra, note 11, at 1185. "'[Tlhe right to be free
of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.'" United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Railroad Tel'rs v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
13. See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 270, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (1973);
Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1977); Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d
947, 949 (Tex. 1976).
14. Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1185.
15. Id. at 1192-93.
16. Id. at 1185, 1193.
17. Id. at 1193. Legislative skepticism toward personal-injury litigation grew
with the advent of the industrial era, ostensibly to insulate industrial forces from a
barrage of personal-injury suits. This resulted in considerable reduction of limitations periods allotted to personal-injury tort actions in many jurisdictions. Id.
18. Id. at 1199.
19. Id. at 1199-1200; see, e.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566,
572 (3d Cir, 1976); Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 96 Cal. App.3d 321, 327, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 779, 783 (Ct. App. 1979); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 271, 300 A.2d 563, 568
(1973); Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex. 1977).
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fense, accrual of a plaintiff's cause of action marks the crucial point
of inquiry. The date of accrual is generally what sets the statute in
motion, 20 for accrual "delineat[es] that combination of facts or
events which permits maintenance of a lawsuit." 2 1 Therefore,
where a breach of contract or most intentional torts are involved,
the statute of limitations begins to run from the moment the act is
committed, since the act itself is a completed wrong against the
plaintiff regardless of damage. 22 Where the basis of the claim is actual damage, however, determining when the statute of limitations
should commence becomes more complex, since there may be a
delay between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's resulting injury or between the plaintiff's injury and his or her discovery of its
23
cause.
As a result, courts have advanced conflicting theories of accrual where harm is the basis of the tort action. 2 4 Some courts
have held that a statute of limitations begins to run at the time of
the defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct, even though a plaintiff
is blamelessly ignorant of the tort or his injury until long after the
limitations period has expired.2 5 Recognizing that it would be ludicrous to require that a suit be brought before a plaintiff knows or
can reasonably be aware that he has been injured, some courts
have applied a discovery rule of limitations, whereby a limitations
period does not commence until the plaintiff discovers or, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered his or her
injury.2 6 Some courts have interpreted the discovery rule so that a

20. E.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 312 (West 1954) (civil actions must be com-

menced within prescribed time period after accrual); N.J..STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2
(West 1952) (actions must be commenced within two years after accrual); N.Y. CIV.
PRAc. LAw § 203(a) (McKinney 1972) (period computed from time cause of action accrued).
21. Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1200.
22. Id. at 1200-01.
23. Id.; see, e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 168, 371 A.2d 170,
172 (1977).
24. Harm is not always the gravamen of a tort action. For example, in cases
involving intentional torts such as false imprisonment and trespass to land, the defendant's conduct in itself invades the plaintiff's rights such that a suit can be maintained regardless of damage. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11 at 42, § 13 at 66
(4th ed. 1971).
25. E.g., Street v. City of Anniston, 381 So.2d 26 (Ala. 1980); Thornton v.
Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). For an
extensive discussion of Thornton, see notes 63-75 infra and accompanying text.
26. E.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Roman v. A. H. Robins Co.,
518 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1975); Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1974).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 5 [1981], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9d1525

statute of limitations begins to run upon the plaintiff's discovery of

the injury and its cause. 2 7 Still others have interpreted the discovery rule to postpone commencement of the limitations period until
the plaintiff learns not only of his injury but also that his injury has
28
been wrongfully inflicted by another.
The discovery rule has been applied to various cases involving

"inherently unknowable" harms or injuries that are latent or progressive in nature. 2 9 It has likewise been applied where the plain-

tiff can prove that the defendant has fraudulently concealed the fact
of harm from him. 30 Whether some permutation of the discovery

rule will be applied in the arena of environmental-tort litigation re31
mains to be seen.

THE APPLICATION OF PERSONAL INJURY
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTALCONTAMINATION SUITS

In the past decade interest in compensation for pollutant injuries has grown along with reports of harms, potential harms, and

attempts at amelioration. 32 A discussion of incidents of toxicsubstances pollution in New York, California, and New Jersey
27. E.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979); Tresemer v. Barke, 86
Cal. App. 3d 656, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1978); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H.
164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977).
28. E.g., Karijala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975);
Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563. Contra, United States v. Kubrick, 444
U.S. 111, 123 (1979) (in medical malpractice claim under Federal Torts Claims Act,
Court specifically rejected proposition that claim accrues upon plaintiff's discovery
that injury was negligently inflicted).
29. E.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (claim not barred where negligence of interstate railroad caused plaintiff to contract silicosis as result of inhaling
silica dust over period of thirty years); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523
F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (claim not barred where construction worker exposed to
large quantities of asbestos dust for 28 years sued manufacturer of asbestos insulation
alleging manufacturer's negligence caused him to develop asbestosis).
30. E.g., Sicumski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259
(1978) (claim not barred where doctor committed malpractice, concealed wrongdoing,
and then affirmatively misrepresented to plaintiff that physiotherapy would rid her of
her discomfort); General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 219 N.E.2d 169,
272 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1966) (claim not barred where bookkeeper embezzled money for
nine years and concealed theft from employer by manipulating organization's books);
see Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1220-22.
31. Given the latent or progressive nature of many projected pollutant injuries,
see Kraus, supra note 3, at 94-97; Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, application of the
discovery rule seems particularly appropriate. See text accompanying notes 91-122
infra.
32.

See SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4.
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illustrates that existing statutes of limitation may foreclose plaintiffs

from recovery for latent or progressive pollution-related injuries.
New York: The Love Canal Catastrophe
The problem of hazardous-waste disposal sites has commanded
national attention due to events at the Love Canal in Niagara Falls
in August 1978. 33 Love Canal residents became "victims of a
technological assault" when toxic chemical wastes buried over
twenty-five years ago leaked from landfill sites and wrought havoc
on the surrounding area. 34 Poisonous chemical wastes infiltrated
scores of neighboring basements and the Niagara River, and an array of dangerous chemicals volatized into the air. Hooker Chemical
and Plastics Corporation disposed of 352 million pounds of industrial chemical waste between 1930 and 1953. 35 It is estimated that 460,000 pounds of the total figure constitute trichlorophenol (TCP), the manufacture of which produces ultratoxic
dioxin, a potentially lethal poison. 36 Residents of the Love Canal
area first discovered chemicals seeping from the dumping site in
1976 after a period of unusually heavy rain.3 Air-quality tests subsequently conducted in the basements of nearby homes revealed
the presence of carcinogenic and teratogenic chemical substances. 38
The Love Canal situation, resulted in theI declaration of a health
emergency by the Commissioner of Health and prompted the State
to do the following: contain the wastes; evacuate families living in
the immediate vicinity; purchase 239 homes; study the problem of
39
hazardous waste disposal; and recommend remedial measures.
The tragic physical consequences of Love Canal have already
33.

Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings, supra note 4 pt. 2, at 2-3;

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1; see N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1978, at B1, col. 3;

id., Aug. 4, 1978, at B14, col. 1; id., Aug. 2, 1978, at Al, col. 1.
34. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 2-3;
Newsweek, Dec. 11, 1978, at 16, 18. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1978, at B4, col. 1.
35. SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 43. The Hooker Chemical Company is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation. Id. at 143.
36. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1978, at B4, col. 1.
37. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 43; see Newsweek, Dec. 11, 1978, at 16,
18.
38. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 43. Kraus defines a carcinogen as "a
substance, chemical, physical or biological, which increases the incidence of cancer." Kraus, supra note 3, at 83 n.2. A teratogenic substance is one which tends to
produce gross deformity of the body, "causing the development of monsters, monstrosities, deformed fetuses or infants." 3 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE T-29 (1979).
39. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
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begun to manifest themselves. At public hearings convened by the
New York Commissioner of Environmental Conservation, present
and former Love Canal homeowners testified that they and their
families have suffered acute medical injuries including miscarriages, birth defects, liver disease, chemical burns, chronic physical
illness, nervous disorders, and cancer. Attempted suicides and
emotional distress have also been reported.40 Dr. Beverly Paigen,
a cancer research scientist at Roswell Park Memorial Institute in
Buffalo, New York, conducted studies indicating that families living
near the Love Canal dump site are particularly susceptible to
health problems including but not limited to asthma, nervous
breakdowns, urinary disease, miscarriage, birth defects, and crib
deaths. 41 Latent medical injuries may also occur, since the wastes
discovered in the air and water near the abandoned, sixteen-acre
teratogenic. 42
Love Canal site are carcinogenic, mutagenic, and
43
Stress-associated disorders may also be anticipated.
Private plaintiffs may be reluctant to seek compensation for
pollutant injuries due to the prospect of expensive and protracted
litigation and the difficulty of proving that exposure to toxic substances caused their injuries. 44 The latter is especially true if the
injury alleged is a chronic, long-latency disease. 45 Plaintiffs who do
initiate litigation will be faced with the problem of filing their
claims within the statutorily prescribed period of limitations. New
York State legislators do recognize the existence of the problem. In
1980, legislation was introduced to amend the current statute of
limitations to afford plaintiffs seeking recovery for injuries "arising

40. Id. at 13.
41. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at
62-79. Dr. Paigen has a Ph.D. in biology, and her research specialty is genetic sus"ceptibility
to environmental toxins. She served on the Environmental
Protection
Agency's Toxic Substances Advisory Committee from 1977 to 1979 and on the Carcinogen Assessment Group (also an E.P.A. group) which "makes quantitative risk assessments of hazards from cancer-causing chemicals." Id. at 62.
42. SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 8. For definitions of carcinogenic and
teratogenic, see note 38 supra. A mutagenic substance is one which causes or is capable of causing mutation, a change in genetic material. 2 SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEYS'
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE M-135 (1979).
43. SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 43.
44. Id. at 515; Estep, supra note 3, at 262-63, 266-67, 269-75; Kraus, supra note
3, at 104-07.
45. See, e.g., SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 489: "The short history of
toxic substances pollution as a national phenomenon is such that conclusive evidence of the long-term effects of land and water pollution is not readily available."
Estep, supra note 3, at 269-75.
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or resulting" from hazardous wastes ample time to file suit, 46 but

the bill did not succeed in the state senate. 47 Similar legislation

was introduced in 1981,48 but it also was unsuccessful.4 9 Without

such legislative action, most plaintiffs alleging a cause of action
based on an injury resulting from contact or exposure to hazardous
wastes have little hope of getting into court. An examination of
New York law in this area demonstrates the unfortunate plight of
these plaintiffs.
The time-of-exposure rule.-The time within which an action
must be commenced in New York is generally computed "from the
time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed." 50 The statute of limitations for personal injuries is three
years, 51 and, since the amendment under consideration did not
succeed, 52 it appears that this limitations period is applicable to situations where personal injury results from exposure to hazardous
and toxic wastes. Crucial to the determination of when the threeyear limitations period commences is the ability to ascertain when
the plaintiff's cause of action accrued. New York courts have pinpointed three times at which a cause of action may be deemed to
have accured: (1) when the act complained of took place (the general rule);53 (2) when the plaintiff was last exposed to a continuing
46.

A.8789-B, 203d Sess. (1980); S.9642-A, 203d Sess., N.Y. SENATE J. 652

(1980).
47. The proposed legislation apparently fell prey to Senate fears that the bill,
as drafted, would subject the state, its political subdivisions or any instrumentalities
of either to liability in the context of third-party actions. Conversation with Mr.
Richard Rosso, Legislative Director to State Assemblyman Robin Schimminger,
March 24, 1981 (notes of conversation on file in office of Hofstra Law Review). It is
difficult to understand the basis for such concern, since the bill contained specific
provisions removing "[tihe state, any public corporation, department, board, bureau,
division, agency, commission, authority, officer, employee or any of them" from the
scope of the proposed discovery rule. A.8789-B, 203d Sess. (1980); S.9642-A, 203d
Sess., N.Y. SENATE J. 652 (1980). This exemption appears in the 1981 proposal as
well. A.2572, 204th Sess. (1981); S.3795, 204th Sess. (1981).
48. A.2572, 204th Sess. (1981); S.3795, 204th Sess. (1981).
49. The bill was passed by the Assembly in April 1981, but was still in the
Senate Codes Committee when the legislative session ended.
50. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 203(a) (McKinney 1972).
51. Id. § 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
52. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
53. E.g., Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (cause of action accrued when substance complained of was first
introduced into decedent's body and not when her cancer became apparent);
Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 217-18, 188 N.E.2d 142,
144-45, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717-19, modified on other grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190
N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963) (cause of action accrued upon introduction of harmful substance into plaintiff's body).
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wrong;5 4 or (3) when the plaintiff discovers or, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered his or her cause of
55
action.
In New York a cause of action accrues when the act com-

plained of is committed, regardless of when the injury is discovered or becomes ascertainable. 56 A 1963 negligence case, Schwartz
v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp.,5 7 illustrates these principles
at work. In 1944, a product called Umbrathor was inserted into the
plaintiff's sinuses to enhance their visibility in x-rays. The plaintiff

alleged that a portion of the substance (later discovered to have radioactive and carcinogenic properties) remained in his body and
caused him to develop cancer requiring the removal of an eye in

1957.58 The Court of Appeals held that the cause of action accrued
upon the introduction of the harmful substance into the plaintiff's
body, despite the plaintiff's inability to determine that he had been
59
harmed until the disease manifested itself over a decade later.
Apparently, the Court of Appeals assumed that the chemical immediately acted upon the plaintiff and thereby caused damage, however imperceptible, to his bodily tissue.60 Despite recognizing that

54. E.g., Borgia v. City of N.Y., 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1962). The New York Legislature has codified the continuous tort
theory of accrual as applied to medical malpractice actions in N.Y. Civ. PPAc. LAW §
214-a (McKinney Supp. 1980), which provides in part:
An action for medical malpractice must be commenced within two years
and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last treatment
where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition
which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure.... For the purpose of
this section the term "continuous treatment" shall not include examinations
undertaken at the request of the patient for the sole purpose of ascertaining
the state of the patient's condition.
Id.; see notes 82-90 infra and accompanying text.
55. E.g., Flanagan v. Mount. Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431, 248 N.E.2d
871, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 27 (1969) (in medical malpractice action Court of Appeals
held statute of limitations began to run upon plaintiff's discovery in 1966 that surgical clamps had been negligently left in her body during 1958 operation); see notes
93-109 infra and accompanying text.
56. Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d
920 (1979); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d
142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, modified on other grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253,
239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963).
57. 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, modified on other
grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S.
808 (1963).
58. Id. at 215, 188 N.E.2d at 143, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
59. Id. at 217-18, 188 N.E.2d at 144-45, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
60. See id. at 217, 188 N.E.2d at 144, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
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its decision might be criticized as unjust due to the insidious nature of cancer, the court adhered strictly to precedent and legislative judgment and ultimately rejected an extension of the limitations period. 61 In an age where there is often a considerable gap
between technical injury and cognizable harm, 62 the Schwartz decision lags far behind the times; yet any expectation that the Court
of Appeals would reconsider the implications of its holding63was
dashed in the 1979 decision of Thornton v. Roosevelt Hospital.

Thornton presented the Court of Appeals with the opportunity
to fashion a more logical approach to accrual, whereby a limitations
period would not commence until a reasonable plaintiff discovered
or should have discovered his or her injury. In 1954, Susan
Thornton received an injection of Thorotrast to make her sinus cavity perceptible to x-rays. The defendants knew, but the plaintiff did
not, that Thorotrast had radioactive properties and could have
carcinogenic effects. In 1972, the plaintiff became afflicted with cancer and thereafter interposed her claim against the defendants.
Prior to that date the plaintiff knew nothing of her disease, for
medical examinations during the intervening years yielded no diagnosis of cancer, and she suffered no tell-tale symptoms between
1954 and 1972. The plaintiff maintained that the Thorotrast first
produced its cancerous consequences in late 1972 or early 1973 despite the drug's initial introduction into her body in 1954. The defendant argued that the harm occurred in 1954 and that, consequently, the action was time-barred. 64 The court responded with
characteristic precedential conservatism, expressly declining the invitation to extend judicially the statutory limitations period and
leaving such reform to the legislature. 65 "[W]hen chemical compounds are injected into a person's body, the injury occurs upon
the drug's introduction, not when the alleged deleterious effects of
its component chemicals become apparent." 66 Noting that in the
context of medical malpractice an action could be commenced after
discovery of a foreign object negligently left in a patient's body, the
Thornton court pointed to a statutory distinction between foreign
61. Id. at 218-19, 188 N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
62. See Hutton, Statute of Limitations and Radiation Injury, 23 TENN. L. REV.
278 (1954); Kraus, supra note 3, at 84, 94, 102.
63. 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
64. See id. at 782, 391 N.E.2d at 1004, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 781-82, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
66. Id. at 781, 391 N.E.2d at 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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objects and chemical compounds. The former are encompassed
within New York's limited statutory codification of the discovery
rule while the latter are excluded from its operation. 6 7 Why the
court believed the statutory exclusion of chemical compounds from
the medical malpractice "foreign objects" discovery rule relevant to
the products liability case before it is unclear. What is clear, however, is the court's failure to balance the policies served by its refusal to deviate from precedent against those compromised by its
rejection of the discovery rule. 68 The present state of New York
law in this area coupled with judicial hesitancy to embark upon allegedly legislative territory is particularly alarming, given the
growing realization that chemical compounds encountered by a majority of Americans during the course of a normal day are known
69
causative agents of various latent and slowly progressive diseases.
The Thornton decision has yet to be modified or overruled.
Nevertheless, it has not gone uncriticized. Judge Fuchsberg's dissenting opinion 70 describes the injustice of barring a cause of action
before a prospective plaintiff can ascertain that he or she has been
injured:
[The number of products] with a latent or slowly evolving potential for harm . . . grows greater all the time. More and more,
they compel their users to place blind reliance on the care with
which they are designed, tested, fabricated, marketed and administered. Characteristically, the dangers they carry are hidden; as often as not, the earliest indication of harm may not turn
up until a point remote in time, the adverse effect meanwhile
being unknown and perhaps even nonexistent. Good sense and

67. Id.; see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1980).
[Wlhere the [medical malpractice] action is based upon the discovery of
a foreign object in the body of the patient, the action may be commenced
within one year of the date of such discovery or of the date of discovery of
facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier
.... For the purpose of this section the term "foreign object" shall not include a chemical compound, fixation device or prosthetic aid or device.
Id.
68. The balance would weigh repose and administrative expediency against the
competing interests of plaintiffs in having adequate time to discover their injuries
and decide whether or not to seek recovery. Perhaps most significant is the
plaintiff's interest in being able to present his or her claim on the merits-an interest
virtually ignored in the Thornton opinion.
69. See Kraus, supra note 3, at 84-85, 96-97, 102.
70. 47 N.Y.2d at 782-85, 391 N.E.2d at 1003-06, 417 N.YS.2d at 922-24.
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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good law therefore require, it seems to me (and apparently to
many courts), that the injured user not be foreclosed from having his day in court before he even has knowledge of any injury

and certainly not before any injury has occurred. 7 '

Judge Fuchsberg despaired both at his colleagues' rigid adherence
to stare decisis and at their consequent failure to accommodate the
"dynamic nature of personal injury law." 72 He perceived a judicial
duty to "readily reexamine established precedent to achieve the
ends of justice in a more modem context." 73 Likening the policy
objectives in latent or progressive injury cases to those governing
infants' cases, he remarked that "It]he adult victim of a drug whose
injurious effect, like that of a time bomb, is either delayed or unknowable, is clearly as helpless to act as an infant," who, either
"too immature or too unaware of his or her right to act" must not
be barred from suit. 74 In conclusion the Judge censured the majority's decision to await legislative amendment of the statute of limitations, viewing it as "an abdication of" the judiciary's "role in the
scheme of government to defer to the Legislature for rescue from
'75
an unconscionable decisional law.
Judge Fuchsberg's comments on products that remain latent
in the body after ingestion only to reveal their deleterious effects at
71. Id. at 783, 391 N.E.2d at 1004, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 784, 391 N.E.2d at 1005, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 785, 391 N.E.2d at 1005, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 785, 391 N.E.2d at 1006, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Judicial deference to the legislative branch is not uncommon in the field of
statutory interpretation. Professor Samuel Mermin attributes such deference to a general judicial belief that courts "[are] in a subordinate power relationship to the legislature." S. MEPRiN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 223 (1973). Where the legislature
has made it implicitly clear, however, that the court is to play the major role in interpretation-as where the legislature "deliberately enacts a vague provision"-judicial
deference to the legislature may be unwarranted. Id. at 223, 227. Statutes of limitations would appear to fall into the latter category, since legislatures generally use the
vague term "accrual" to describe the point at which a limitations period shall commence, leaving the tasks of interpretation to the courts. See statutes cited note 20 supra. For judicial support of the proposition that the courts can define accrual when
the legislature has failed to do so, see Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 97
Cal. App. 3d 881, 884-85, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113, 115 (Ct. App. 1979). See Developments
in the Law, supra note 11, at 1185, 1189, 1200. Absent legislative definition of accrual, postponing commencement of limitations periods can be viewed as a judicial
prerogative which may or may not be exercised depending upon how a court interprets the accrual concept.
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a much later date are pertinent to the growing problems of
hazardous- and toxic-waste disposal. 76 Professor William R.
Ginsberg, a presiding Hearing Officer at public hearings on the
problems of hazardous-waste disposal in Erie and Niagara Counties, 77 has noted that an environmental tort may occur "when the
wastes are buried, . ..when contaminated substances migrate out
of the site into neighboring property, when they are released into
the atmosphere, or when they enter the ground or drinking
water."78 Regardless of when the technical wrong is committed, resulting pollutant injuries may not occur or be ascertainable for considerable periods of time, since many toxic substances often "tasteless and odorless" in nature operate "insidiously" upon those who
come in contact with them. 79 Given the Environmental Protection
Agency's estimate that there may be 50,000 hazardous-waste disposal sites nationwide, 2000 of which may have "the lethal potential of a Love Canal,"80 it is likely that the problem of latent and
progressive pollutant injuries will be one of considerable magnitude.
It is clear, then, that application of the strict theory of accrual,
reaffirmed in Thornton, to personal-injury claims arising from
hazardous- and toxic-waste disposal may prevent more than an occasional plaintiff from having his or her day in court. Since a substantial number of plaintiffs may be foreclosed from trying their
cases on the merits, defendants' interests in repose can no longer
be the controlling factor in the policy balance. Hence, the New
York courts and legislature should consider extension of a discovery rule to personal-injury environmental-tort claims involving be76. TASK FORCE
77.

REPORT, supra note 4, at 80.
The hearings took place in early May, 1979, in conjunction with the New

York Senate Standing Committee on Conservation and Recreation, the Assembly
Standing Committee on Environmental Conservation, the Senate Subcommittee on
Toxic Substances and Chemical Waste, and the Assembly Environmental Conservation Committee Task Force on Toxic Substances. Id. at 1-2. See also Ginsberg &
Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTnA L.
REV.859 (1981).
78.

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 80.

79. Id. at 80-81; See Hutton, supra note 62, at 281; Kraus, supra note 3, at 84.
Additionally, Kraus notes that identification of a cause-and-effect relationship
between an environmental carcinogen and cancer is "highly improbable" due to
"[tihe long latency period, the cumulative effect, the increased mobility of modern
society, and the persistence of many of these chemicals in the environment and food
chain .. ."Id. at 96.
80. Hazardous and Toxic Waste DisposalHearings,supra note 4, pt. 2, at 2.
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latedly detected latent and progressive diseases.81 Under current
New York law there are exceptions to the general time-of-exposure
rule which could grant plaintiffs access to the courts in some hazardous-waste-disposal controversies.
The continuing-wrong theory.-One exception to the time-ofexposure rule enables a plaintiff to sue on a theory of "continuing
tort," whereby the statute of limitations does not begin to run until

the last in a series of allegedly tortious acts is committed.8 2 This
theory has been invoked frequently in the context of medical malpractice. Where a plaintiff has undergone a continuous course of
medical treatment and has subsequently discovered a personal injury resulting from such treatment, his or her cause of action is

deemed to have accrued on the last day of treatment.8 3 This is the
rule regardless of when the doctor committed the malpractice, so

long as the treatment is for the same or related injury or damage,
continuing after the alleged acts of malpractice, and not mere continuity of a general professional relationship. 84 The continuoustreatment theory may be applied constructively to one who can

reasonably expect that his or her work will be relied upon by others in the chain of diagnosis or treatment, a practice which may
save what would otherwise be an untimely claim against a defendant.8 5 Although the continuous-treatment theory has somewhat alleviated the harshness of the general time-of-exposure rule, the

doctrine is of no help to a patient where more than two and onehalf years have elapsed since the last treatment, since that is the

81. The New York State Legislature considered a discovery rule in 1980,
A.8789-B, 203d Sess. (1980); S.9642-A, 203d Sess., N.Y. SENATE J. 652 (1980), and in
1981, A.2572, 204th Sess. (1981); S.3795, 204th Sess. (1981).
82. N.Y. Civ. PR¢c. LAw § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1980) (medical malpractice);
see, e.g., Borgia v. City of N.Y., 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1962).
83. N.Y. Civ. PiAc. LAw § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1980); see, e.g., Borgia v.
City of N.Y., 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1962).
The continuing-wrong theory has also been applied in a case involving underground
trespass. 509 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 15 N.Y.2d 48, 203
N.E.2d 486, 255 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1964).
84. See Dobbins v. Clifford, 39 A.D.2d 1, 330 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1972) (patient who
in 1970 discovered injury due to 1966 operation could not use continuous-treatment
theory because later treatment must be for same or related injuries).
85. Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (continuous treatment by doctor imputed to manufacturer of prosthetic device to extend
statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff's negligence and strict liability causes of
action against manufacturer).
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limitations period the legislature has fixed for medical-malpractice
actions predicated upon the continuous-treatment theory.8 6
The continuing-wrong exception to the general time-ofexposure rule might be invoked in cases where the movement
of toxic substances onto private property results in personal injury.
Arguably, the migration of toxic substances does not occur immediately upon their burial or disposal, but takes place over an extended period of time. 87 Even if this is true, however, a theory of
continuing tort will not enable victims of toxic-substances pollution
to circumvent the limitations barrier, for a plaintiff still has the
burden of proving that the last date of his or her exposure to the
contamination was at most three years prior to the lawsuit's inception. 8 8 Thus, as Professor Ginsberg has observed, a Love Canal
homeowner who has stopped using a contaminated well and who,
after the limitations period has expired (computed from the last day
he used the well), discovers that the well water has caused serious
disease, will be barred from asserting his or her cause of action.8 9
Likewise, a homeowner who has been evacuated or who has voluntarily moved and lived elsewhere for more than three years will
have no recourse upon discovery of an illness or birth defect that
may have been caused by prior exposure to toxic substances, regardless of the merits of his or her claim.90 In addition, a plaintiff
will have to prove that three years prior to the filing of his or her
claim, the defendant was engaged in polluting activity which proximately caused his or her injury. Thus, a defendant who has actively polluted the environment but who has discontinued such activity more than three years prior to the institution of a plaintiff's
suit may escape liability, even though his or her conduct may have
caused the injury that the plaintiff belatedly discovered.
The continuing-tort theory offers an equivocal advantage to
plaintiffs while safeguarding defendants' interests in repose. While
it may postpone accrual until three years after a plaintiff's last exposure to certain conditions, it does nothing to ameliorate the situation where injury first becomes ascertainable more than three
years Ofter a plaintiff's last exposure to toxic substances. If, as a
86.
87.

N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1980).
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 81.

88.

N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 214(5) (McKinney Supp. 1980).

89.

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 82.
Id. The TASK FORCE REPORT assumes that

90.
a three-year limitations period
would apply if the continuing-wrong theory encompassed environmental contamination suits; it is unclear, however, whether a two and one-half or a three-year period
would in fact be applied.
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policy matter, the legislature must assign a limitations period to

personal injury claims and the courts must advance strict theories
of accrual lest defendants' interests in repose be virtually ignored,
then it is imperative that the policy's relevance to existing social

conditions and modem scientific knowledge be established. It is
this last criterion which the New York courts and Legislature have

neglected, and it is this last criterion which holds the key to just
resolution of claims involving latent pollution injuries.

The time-of-discovery rule.-Under a time-of-discovery rule,
the cause of action does not accrue and the statute of limitations

does not begin to run until the injured party knows or should know
of his injury and its origin. The discovery rule appears logical in all
cases where a diligent plaintiff first learns of his or her injury and

its origin long after the defendant's actionable conduct takes
place. 91 The New York Court of Appeals, however, has exhibited

general reluctance to employ the discovery rule unless a statute expressly provides for its application. 92 An exception to this general

trend can be found in Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospi91. In certain situations, the statute of limitations may be tolled pending a
plaintiff's discovery of certain facts which presumably would lead him or her to file
a claim. For example, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may toll the operation of the
statute of limitations pending a plaintiff's discovery of his or her cause of action.
Where a defendant fraudulently conceals from the plaintiff that he or she has a cause
of action and the plaintiff is not negligent in failing to learn of the wrong, the defendant may be estopped from raising the limitations defense. See, e.g., Simcuski v.
Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 449-51, 377 N.E.2d 713, 716-17, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262-64
(1978) (doctor who had committed malpractice, concealed it, and told plaintiff that
physiotherapy would rid her of discomfort could not use statute of limitations as defense to claim); General Stencils Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 126-29, 219 N.E.2d
169, 170-72, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339-41 (1966) (if plaintiff could prove that bookkeeper
accused of embezzlement had concealed theft and that plaintiff was not negligent in
failing to learn of theft, suit not barred). The notion underlying this principle is that
a defendant should not be permitted to take refuge behind the shield of his or her
own wrong. 44 N.Y.2d at 454, 377 N.E.2d at 719, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 266. Estoppel may

be invoked to toll the statute of limitations where the plaintiff can prove the following: (1) that misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment by the defendant prevented the plaintiff from discovering the wrong; and (2) that he himself exercised
due diligence in bringing the action. Id. at 450, 377 N.E.2d at 716, 406 N.Y.S.2d at
263.
Although it is certainly arguable that Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation
concealed the dangers associated with toxic-waste disposal from the Love Canal residents, absent any specific documentation of this assertion, victims of toxic-substances
injury will undoubtedly be foreclosed from implementing equitable estoppel as a
ground for application of the discovery principle.
92. See, e.g., Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188
N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, modified on other grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 190
N.E.2d 253, 259 N.Y.S.2d 896, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963).
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tal,9 3 the seminal case in which a plaintiff successfully invoked the
discovery rule despite the absence of a legislative mandate
authorizing its application. In Flanagan a doctor negligently left
surgical clamps in the plaintiff's abdomen during surgery in 1958.
In the spring of 1966, the plaintiff first experienced severe abdominal pain, whereupon she immediately consulted a physician and
learned that her condition stemmed from the presence of surgical
clamps in her body. One week after this discovery the plaintiff underwent an operation to remove the clamps, and shortly thereafter
the plaintiff instituted suit against the physician although the malpractice had occurred over eight years earlier. 94 The Court of Appeals, distinguishing between negligent medical treatment such as
that involved in Schwartz, 95 and malpractice in which a foreign object is left in the plaintiff's body, held that "where a foreign object
has negligently been left in the patient's body, the Statute of Limitations will not begin to run until the patient could have reasonably
discovered the malpractice."' 96 The court explained that, as applied
in foreign-objects medical-malpractice cases, the discovery rule is
compatible with the purposes underlying statutes of limitations:
First, an undiscovered clamp lodged within the patient's body "retains its identity so that a defendant's ability to defend a 'stale'
claim is not unduly impaired;" second, "the danger of belated, false,
or frivolous claims is eliminated;" third, such a claim does not raise
questions as to a plaintiff's credibility or a physician's professional
diagnostic judgment; and fourth, there is no possible causal break
97
between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury. It
is noteworthy that the Flanagan court applied the discovery rule
absent any legislative mandate to do so. Instead, the court examined the law of various jurisdictions, recognized that numerous
states applied the discovery rule in foreign-objects medical-malpractice cases, approved the logic underlying its application, and
consequently determined that the discovery rule "is not only an
equitable rule but also entirely consistent with the underlying purpose of the Statute of Limitations." '9 8 Despite the Flanagan hold-

93.

24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).

94. Id. at 428, 248 N.E.2d at 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25.
95.

12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963). See text accompa-

nying notes 57-61 supra.
96. 24 N.Y.2d at 431, 248 N.E.2d at 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
97. Id. at 430-31, 248 N.E.2d at 872-73, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
98. Id. at 431-32, 248 N.E.2d at 874, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
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ing in support of the discovery rule, the New York Legislature did
not codify a discovery rule applicable to foreign-objects medicalmalpractice cases until six years after the Flanagan decision. 99
The definition of what constitutes foreign objects has proved
rather flexible.1 0 0 The legislature has excluded various items such

as prosthetic devices, chemical compounds, and fixation devices
from the foreign-objects category,' 0 1 apparently leaving the task of
determining what will be considered foreign objects to the courts.
The legislature has not yet enacted a foreign-objects discovery rule
applicable to cases involving ordinary negligence, and, therefore,
statutory exclusion of chemical compounds from the foreign-objects

medical-malpractice discovery rule need not control future treatment of chemical compounds for ordinary negligence purposes.
However, judicial reluctance to encroach upon legislative preroga-

tives,10 2 fear of specious claims,' 0 3 and the difficulties of proving
negligence and causation where the wrong is not evidenced by a

tangible foreign object

04

discovery rule will be

99.

leave little hope that a foreign-objects
applied in ordinary negligence cases

N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1980) (originally enacted in

1975 N.Y. Laws, ch. 109, § 6).
100. Typically, a foreign object is a clamp or other surgical instrument left in
the plaintiff's body during the course of medical treatment. In Flanagan, for example, the foreign object complained of was a surgical clamp. The rationale for the
foreign-objects exception, however, is broad enough to embrace circumstances
which, upon closer examination, do not involve a foreign object left in a plaintiff's
body. For example, in Smalls v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 55 A.D.2d
537, 389 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1976) (memorandum), where a needle inserted into and removed from the plaintiff's spine in 1973 caused the plaintiff to feel pain for over a
year before she learned from another physician that the prior treatment had caused
the injury, the plaintiff could compute the limitations period from the date she discovered the wrong. Conceding that the case did not truly involve a "foreign object,"
the court nonetheless applied the foreign-objects rule, since the rationale behind the
rule would not be compromised. Id. at 538, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 372-73. Merced v. New
York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 56 A.D.2d 553, 391 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1977) (memorandum) demonstrated that even a fetus might come within the foreign-objects exception. The plaintiff had undergone a sterilization procedure in 1971. Two years
later, however, she had an ectopic pregnancy in the left fallopian tube. The court
invoked the foreign-objects exception in its general terms, holding that the statute of
limitations began to run upon the plaintiff's discovery that the sterilization procedure had been improperly performed. Id., 391 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
101. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1980).
102. See note 75 supra.
103. See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d at 218, 188
N.E.2d at 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
104. See Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 488, 517-18; Kraus, supra note 3,
at 96.
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involving latent or progressive injuries stemming from toxicsubstances pollution.
A lone indication of judicial extension of the discovery rule
from medical-malpractice foreign-objects cases to an ordinary negligence case can be seen in the 1972 decision of Le Vine v. Isoserve,
Inc.,10 5 where the plaintiff sought recovery for radiation injuries allegedly caused by a defective isotope. Le Vine had worked on a radioactive isotope in 1963. Seven years later he discovered that he
had sustained serious alpha radiation injury due to the defective
nature of the isotope.- 0 6 Although alpha radiation is not a foreign
object in the tangible sense required by Flanagan, the court bad
no difficulty in applying the discovery rule in the Le Vine case.
Reasoning that the possibility of a fraudulent claim for alpha radiation damage was minimal due to the availability of the isotope and
records addressing its defective condition, the court held that on
these facts there was no reason for the plaintiff to be barred by the
statute from bringing his lawsuit before he even realized that he
had been injured. 10 7 The court conceded that the causal inference
in the case at hand was weaker than that in a foreign-objects
medical-malpractice case; 10 8 it concluded, however, that "the problems involved in connecting the negligence with the injuries are
better left to trial rather than ipso facto depriving the plaintiffs of
their opportunity to surmount these problems."' 0 9
Desirability of the discovery rule in environmental-tort cases.
-This extension of the Flanagan discovery rule makes eminently
good sense. The plaintiff was given the benefit of a limitations period commencing upon discovery of his injury. Rather than
precluding him from having his day in court, the court allowed him
to try his case on the merits. Trial on the merits is a more equitable basis upon which to determine liability than is strict adherence
to a codified limitations period and rigid interpretation of the accrual concept. By extending the discovery rule to latent-injury negligence cases in which plaintiffs are blamelessly ignorant of their injuries and causes of action, courts will be able to render humane
judgments which more accurately reflect which risks society is willing to bear as a cost of progress and which are totally unacceptable.
Admittedly, a considerable measure of repose is sacrificed under
105.

70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (memorandum).

106. Id. at 748-49, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
107. Id. at 750-52, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
108. Id.
109. Id. (italics in original).
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this view. Likewise, this approach would impose significant costs
on insurance companies and industry generally."i 0 These considerations, however, are outweighed by the unfairness of depriving a
potentially large number of plaintiffs of effective remedies.
The most desirable remedial measure that can be taken to alleviate the burden of New York's strict rule of accrual is legislative
amendment of the statute of limitations to provide a discovery rule
for causes of action involving latent personal injuries resulting from
toxic-waste contamination. The bills introduced in the New York
State Legislature in 1980 and 1981"'1 demonstrate legislative recognition that current law must be changed.'1 2 Under the proposed
amendments, actions
to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property
arising or resulting from contact or exposure to a hazardous
waste . . .may be commenced (i) within three years from the

date of such injury, or (ii) within two years from the earlier of either the date of the discovery of such injury or from date of discovery of fact which would reasonably lead to such discovery."i 3
The proposed legislation also contains a provision whereby an
action previously barred by the statute of limitations "is hereby revived, and an action thereon may be commenced and prosecuted
provided such action is commenced within one year of the effective
date of this act. '""14 Passage of this amendment would be a significant step toward remedying the harsh limitations rules currently
5
faced by New York plaintiffs."1
110.
111.

Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A.J. 139, 141 (February 1981).
A.2572, 204th Sess. (1981); S.3795, 204th Sess. (1981); A.8789-B, 203d
Sess. (1980); S.9642-A, 203d Sess., N.Y. SENATE J. 652 (1980). The proposals were
identical in both years.
112. The memorandum submitted in support of the proposed legislation reflects legislative recognition of a need to "expand an injured party's legal recourse

for compensation due to injury or illness caused by exposure to or contact with a
hazardous waste." N.Y. State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation, Bill
No. A.2572, 1 (1981) (sponsored by Assemblyman Schimminger) (copy of file in office of Hofstra Law Review). The memorandum further states that "the unfairness of
existing law requires the Legislature to provide a remedy to enable the victims of
this tragedy to seek redress for their injuries." Id.
113. A.2572, 204th Sess. (1981); S.3795, 204th Sess. (1981); A.8789-B, 203d
Sess. (1980); S.9642-A, 203d Sess., N.Y. SENATE J. 652 (1980).
114. A.2572, 204th Sess. (1981); S.3795, 204th Sess. (1981); A.8789-B, 203d
Sess. (1980); S.9642-A, 203d Sess., N.Y. SENATE J. 652 (1980).
115. As with all new legislation, however, the proposed amendment contains
questions of interpretation which could present problems to attorneys and the courts.
One such problem lies in the use of the words "injury ... arising or resulting from
... hazardous waste." A.2572, 204th Sess. (1981). If the amendment is passed, courts
should not interpret "arising or resulting from" to require that the plaintiff prove
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Since a change in the current law does not appear imminent,
causation according to a strict legal standard for the discovery provision to apply. It
will be difficult for the plaintiff to prove causation at trial on the merits. Cf. Estep,
supra note 3, at 263-75 (discussing causation problems in cases involving environmental carcinogens); Kraus, supra note 3, at 94-96, 104-11 (discussing problems in
cases involving radiation injuries). To require plaintiffs to do so in order to avail
themselves of the discovery provision may render the provision meaningless. Relaxation of the strict legal standard of causation for plaintiffs seeking access to the courts
in hazardous- and toxic-waste-disposal controversies amply serves the policy of repose, since it may encourage plaintiffs to litigate promptly. Presumably, plaintiffs
stricken by the types of injuries which may result from contact with toxic substances
will want to recover damages as soon as possible so that they need not independently shoulder the weighty financial burdens of alleviating or containing disease.
There is always the possibility that certain plaintiffs will postpone litigation until it
is most advantageous for them, and therefore it is conceivable that a plaintiff might
refrain from filing suit until reasonably certain of a high damages award. However,
since there is no precedent in this area, courts should proceed on a case-by-case basis to interpret "arising or resulting from" in light of the facts in each case, keeping
in mind that the purpose of the amendment is to enable victims of hazardous-waste
pollution, formerly barred by the statute of limitations, to have their day in court. See
note 112 supra.
Similarly, the words "contact or exposure" to a hazardous waste could present
interpretive problems. A.2572, 204th Sess. (1981). Strictly speaking, "contact or exposure" could mean once a year or once a week for a minute or two hours at a time. It
is probable that the type of contact or exposure contemplated by the legislature is
that found typically in hazardous-waste situations -prolonged, usually unknowing
contact over a period of weeks, months, or years. At the same time, since so little information concerning hazardous-waste injuries is available, and the data that is available are constantly being updated and revised, courts should, as in the interpretation
of "arising or resulting from," look closely at the facts of each case to determine what
"contact or exposure" is sufficient to give the plaintiff his or her day in court.
The revival provision, id., may appear at first glance to be an invitation to a barrage of litigation. By reviving all time-barred claims the statute could encourage litigation by plaintiffs who were previously barred due to their own inaction. The drafters of the amendment appear to envision a limitations scale that tips in favor of
plaintiffs; in other words, the risk of occasional frivolous claims is outweighed by the
equity of providing adequate remedies to good-faith plaintiffs previously barred under any of New York's approaches to the statute of limitations.
Notwithstanding this apparently plaintiff-protective scheme, an avalanche of litigation is unlikely. First, the revival period is limited to one year from the effective
date of the act, leaving potential litigants only twelve months to consider the possibility and feasibility of litigation, consult with an attorney, and ultimately decide
whether to litigate. Id. Once a decision to litigate is made, the attorney must first begin to marshal often complex evidence, decide upon the theory or theories of the
case, and prepare the litigation papers. Second, an individual who has attempted
unsuccessfully to obtain recovery for an injury linked to hazardous waste and whose
claim has been revived may determine that the monetary or emotional costs of litigation are simply too great to endure for a second time. Thus, while some plaintiffs
may have their claims revived, the repose values at the heart of statutes of limitations are not completely diluted by the revival provision. If the provision becomes
law, defendants need fear revived claims for only one year after the effective date of
the act.
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however," i 6 the courts should assume a more flexible position,
recognizing the special judicial and social interest in protecting the
health and welfare of our nation. The courts' determination that
the time of accrual is a peculiarly legislative decision is unpersuasive, especially since the legislature, by failing to define accrual,
seems to have left the tasks of definition and interpretation to the
courts.1 1 7 The judiciary would do well to consider that its action

may be vital in alerting the legislature to particular problems so that
their resolution may ultimately be expedited by legislative action.
Application of the discovery rule is particularly appropriate in
the context of environmental-tort litigation. First, since many have
already fallen prey to environmental contamination and since many
projected pollutant injuries having latent properties may not begin
i18
to surface until long after the statute of limitations has expired,
it is likely that more than an occasional plaintiff may be denied access to the courts. Second, although defendants may strenuously
argue that they are being unduly burdened by an open-ended statute of limitations, diligent plaintiffs would be unduly and, moreover, illogically burdened if required to commence a personalinjury suit without knowledge that an injury has occurred. Third, a
latent-injury victim's claim is not stale in the sense that he or she
has failed to exercise due diligence; only when the plaintiff knows
of his or her injury and its cause should the public interest in
timely institution of suit attach.
Although a discovery rule and consequent delay in bringing
claims might cause difficulties in adducing evidence, any evidentiary burdens must cut both ways. Both parties must procure evidence, and the initial burden of acquiring and producing such evidence generally lies with the plaintiff. The plaintiff must also
116. The proposed amendment did not pass in the Senate in 1980 or 1981. See
notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
117. The failure of the proposed legislation must not lead courts to conclude
that the Legislature intended that old interpretations of accrual and applications of
the statute of limitations prevail. In fact, the bill proposing a discovery rule cleared
the State Assembly by a vote of 120-19 last year and once again passed through the
Assembly without difficulty on April 8, 1981. Conversation with Mr. Richard Rosso,
Legislative Director to Assemblyman Robin Schimminger, April 29, 1981 (notes of
conversation on file in office of Hofstra Law Review). Additionally, as noted earlier,
see note 47 supra, the bill's failure to emerge from the Senate Rules Committee in
1980 has been attributed to an interpretive technicality rather than to a belief that
the proposed legislation is unnecessary.
118. See Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 72-73, 152, 224-25, 291-92, 355-56,
415-17, 486-87.
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persuade the trier of fact that the defendant was negligent, and,
more significantly, that the negligence caused his or her
injury-not an easy feat considering the paucity of knowledge
about the nature and causes of pollutant injuries. 119 Judicial
economy would not be unduly compromised if reasonable delay in
instituting claims were approved, since plaintiffs unable to justify
discovery and lacking sufficient evidence upon which to base their
claims would be precluded from continuing litigation. Furthermore, considerations such as attorney's fees, the costs of scientific
studies, expert witnesses, and other discovery procedures may discourage the pursuit of potentially significant claims and promote
settlement in lieu of litigation to a verdict. 120 Thus the courts
might not be as crowded as one would expect. Finally, while rigid
application of the limitations period preserves a defendant's historically protected interest in repose, it simultaneously compromises a
countervailing policy which our industrial society would do well to
consider-namely, fostering a higher standard of care for defendants engaged in contaminating activity in order to protect public
health and environmental safety. As Professor Ginsberg noted in
his report on hazardous-waste-disposal problems in Erie and
Niagara Counties, the only possible rationale for requiring a plaintiff to file suit for injury caused by a defendant's alleged misconduct "before the plaintiff knows or can reasonably be aware that he
has been injured" is "a desire to insulate the generator of harm"
from liability. 121 Professor Ginsberg concluded:
[P]ublic policy would best be served by placing responsibility on
the person or entity which introduced the hazardous substances
into the environment, often in the course of profitable endeavor.
Such an approach would place the financial burden in most in-

stances on the party best able to bear it, by internalizing the
cost, and encourage a higher standard of care in the disposal of
hazardous wastes. 122
These arguments are indeed compelling. If a defendant engaged in
contaminating activity can hide behind the arbitrary shield of the
statute of limitations, never having to prove himself out of a case,
119. Id. at 494: "We simply do not know enough about the nature and causes
of... [toxic-substances] ...injuries in many cases to supply the kind of definitive
conclusions about causation that the law makes a prerequisite to compensation."
120. Id. at 493-94.
121. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 83.
122. Id.
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then there will be no incentive for such defendants to raise their
standards of care, and the law will not effectively protect the social
interests in public health and environmental safety.
The CaliforniaProblem:
Groundwater Pollution in Lathrop
The Best Fertilizer Company first established a plant at
Lathrop, California, in 1953. The Occidental Petroleum Corporation acquired the Lathrop plant in 1964. The plant is engaged in
23
the manufacture of fertilizers, pesticides, and their constituents.
Between 1953 and 1976, fertilizer and pesticide wastes were disposed within the planfs boundaries and into nearby unlined ponds
and ditches. 124 The soil in the Lathrop area is highly permeable,
permitting migration of liquids between its surface and groundwater. 125 As a result, the fertilizer and pesticide wastes have traveled through the soil, contaminating the groundwater with radioactive substances and such pesticides as dibromochloropropane
(DBCP), alpha-BHC and Lindane. 126 DBCP is a known carcinogen, mutagen, and teratogen, and it has caused sterility in male
humans. 127 The chronic toxicity of BHC isomers and the potential
liver damage causally related to them have been known since 1950
and 1973 respectively. 128 The carcinogenic properties of Lindane
were disclosed as early as 1972.129
The community of Lathrop sits atop an aquifer which is the
primary source of domestic, industrial, and agricultural water for
the surrounding area.130 Some of the contaminants generating from
the fertilizer and pesticide wastes have been found in hazardous
concentrations in wells used as a source of drinking water. 131 At
least two wells have been closed due to high radiation levels, and
the utility of several others has been destroyed and will continue to
123.

SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 143.

124. Hazardous Waste Disposal: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversite
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 693-94 (1979).
125. SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 141.
126. Id. at 140.

127. Id. at 140, 148.
128. Id. at 148-49.
129. Id. at 149.
130. Id. at 141.
131. Id. at 140. In February, 1979, tests revealed that a domestic well in
Lathrop had 58 parts per billion (ppb) of DBCP. The State of California advises
against drinking water with more than 1 ppb of DBCP. Id.
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be endangered due to the presence of dangerous, radioactive sub33
stances. 1 32 Radiation is known to cause various types of cancer,1

increased susceptibility to disease, 134 shortened lifespan, 135 and genetic damage to unborn generations.136
Approximately 120 people have already been exposed to contaminated water, and since the groundwater emanating from beneath Occidental's plant is migrating at a rate of approximately 175
feet per year, more extensive exposure and consequent latent disease damage may reasonably be anticipated. 137 Under California
law, damages may be recovered for future adverse health effects to
the extent that they are "reasonably certain to occur."' 138 Since the
study of diseases caused by exposure to toxic substances is at such
an early stage, however, the public is generally unacquainted with
the grave and long-term effects of exposure. 13 9 Therefore, victims
of pollutant injuries have no alternative but to institute action once
the latent effects of injury became manifest. If and when the residents of Lathrop and surrounding areas decide to seek redress for
pollutant injuries, they will inevitably be faced with the statute of
limitations.
Application of the discovery rule.-In California, the statute of
limitations in an action for personal injury allows a plaintiff one
140
year from the time the cause of action accrues to institute suit.

4
The cause of action generally accrues at the time of injury.' '
Therefore, under the general rule, plaintiffs suffering from latent or
progressive pollutant injuries will be foreclosed from recovery unless their illnesses surface within the one-year limitations period.
The potential harshness which could result from strict adherence to
the statute of limitations, however, is substantially mitigated by

132. Id. at 140, 145, 149-51.
133. Id. at 149; see Estep, supra note 3, at 266.
134. Estep, supra note 3, at 263.
135. Id. at 264.
136. Id. at 265.
137. Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 140, 141, 152, 173.
138. Khan v. Southern Pacific Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 410, 416, 282 P.2d 78, 82
(Ct. App. 1955); Paolini v. City and County of San Francisco, 72 Cal. App. 2d 579, 591,
164 P.2d 916, 922-23 (Ct. App. 1946); Bauman v. City and County of San Francisco,
42 Cal. App. 2d 144, 163-64, 108 P.2d 989, 1000 (Ct. App. 1940).
139. Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 496.
140. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340 (West Supp. 1981).
141. Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656, 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 387
(1978); Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen. Hosp. 69 Cal. App. 3d 350, 355, 138 Cal.

Rptr. 20, 22 (1977).
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California's liberal application of the discovery rule. The discovery
rule applies in personal-injury actions where "the pathological ef-

fect occurs without perceptible trauma and the victim is 'blamelessly ignorant' of the cause of injury. In such cases the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the person knows or, by the

exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the cause
of injury." 14 2 California courts have applied the discovery rule to

negligence claims grounded upon theories of medical malpractice 143 and strict products liability 4 4 and to other cases involving
47
libel, 145 fraudulent concealment, 146 and fiduciary relationship.1
The plaintiff who invokes the discovery rule to counter his or

her adversary's statute-of-limitations defense must plead facts justifying a judicial determination of delayed accrual.'14 In order to
raise the issue of belated discovery, a "plaintiff must state in his

complaint when the discovery was made, the circumstances surrounding the discovery, and facts which show that the failure to

make an earlier discovery was reasonable, justifiable and not a result of plaintiff's failure to investigate or to act."'149 Once a plaintiff
has pleaded the foregoing, his or her cause of action will be barred
only if the defendant can prove that the plaintiff discovered or in
inthe exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
150
suit.
commencing
to
prior
year
one
least
at
jury and its cause
In cases involving latent or progressive disease, the courts
142.

Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (emphasis

added); accord, G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 122
Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1975).
143. E.g., Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1978).
144. E.g., Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316,
164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980); Frederick v. Calbio Pharmaceuticals, 89 Cal. App. 3d 49,
152 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1979).
145. E.g., Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist., 88 Cal. App. 3d 725, 152
Cal. Rptr. 27 (1979).
146. E.g., Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 321, 157 Cal. Rptr. 779
(1979).
147. See Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (1969).
148. E.g., Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. App. 3d 350, 355,
138 Cal. Rptr. 20, 22 (1977); G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d
22, 26, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1975).
149. Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. App. 3d 350, 356, 138
Cal. Rptr. 20, 22 (1977); see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22,
26, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (1975).
150. Sanchez v. South Hoover Hosp., 18 Cal. 3d 93, 101-02, 553 P.2d 1129,
1135-36, 132 Cal. Rptr. 657, 663-64 (1976) (claim barred where plaintiff suspected
her physician's malpractice more than one year before bringing suit).
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have engaged in detailed analyses to determine the point at which
a plaintiff is deemed to have discovered facts sufficient to trigger
commencement of the limitations period. In Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation,151 the plaintiff, an insulator
who had worked with asbestos products for over thirty years, contracted asbestosis. 152 Radiological findings in 1965 indicated that
Velasquez had tendencies "compatible with asbestosis."' 53 A medical examination conducted in 1967 revealed that his respiratory capacity had dropped below that which was normal for a man his
age. 154 In 1971, the physicians who had examined him in 1967 diagnosed Velasquez' condition as "moderately severe asbestosis" and
informed his personal physician of their findings. 155 The examining
physicians told Velasquez that although he had "indications of
asbestosis" there was no need for him to quit his job provided that
he avoid dust inhalation whenever possible and continue under the
care of his private physician.15 6 By March 1973, Velasquez complained of shortness of breath, at which time he underwent another
physical examination, this time with different physicians. In May
57
1973, "follow-up tests revealed 'positive findings' of asbestosis."'
In November 1973, the physicians who had initially examined
Velasquez reexamined him and found significant progression of his
disease, whereupon they advised him to leave the insulating trade.
Velasquez continued to work, however, until he became disabled
on January 4, 1974.1.58

Notwithstanding his knowledge of the 1971 diagnosis, Velasquez instituted suit in October 1974, within one year of his physicians' warning that he leave the insulating trade and the date of
actual disability and retirement. Fibreboard contended that the
statute of limitations began to run in 1971 upon Velasquez' discovery of the job-related injury, and that therefore the action was
time-barred under the one-year limitations period imposed by
California law.' 59 Faced with the issue of when Velasquez knew or
151. 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1979).
152. Id. at 883, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 114.

153. Id.
154. Id.

155.
156.
chest. Id.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 883-84, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
Id. At the time of this consultation Velasquez felt no discomfort in his
at 884, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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should have discovered that he was suffering from a disease that
had caused him injury which would entitle him to legal relief, the
California Court of Appeals advanced an interesting analytical analogy. Noting that "[lIogically, such knowledge might come as well
from an early diagnosis of a latent disorder as from an experience
of pain or disability of an active disorder," the court concluded that
"where diagnosis is meant to be the essence of discovery," what is
required is that the plaintiff be privy to " 'informed diagnosis'
roughly parallel to 'informed consent' in medical malpractice or
battery actions." 160 Therefore, a plaintiff is not deemed to have discovered a latent or progressive disorder which has caused imperceptible harm until he has reasonable knowledge, through "brief
explanation of findings and prognosis by the examining physician,"
16 1
that the harm has occurred or is likely to occur.
Velasquez is significant for reasons beyond its specific holding.
If applied to cases involving latent or progressive pollution-related
injuries, a plaintiff whose ailment or potential ailment remains
undiagnosed, or diagnosed but unexplained to him, may invoke the
discovery rule if and when he decides to litigate. Thus, he may circumvent the one-year limitations barrier, provided that he fulfills
the pleading requirements of the discovery rule. 162 Although potential defendants might be denied a certain measure of repose,
the "informed diagnosis" approach would not be unduly harsh
upon them for at least three reasons: (1) the pleading requirements
and burdens of proof still bear most heavily upon the plaintiffs; (2)
defendants remain free to challenge plaintiffs' allegations of
justified belated discovery; and (3) defendants may argue that belated discovery, although reasonable on the part of a plaintiff, was
caused by the plaintiff's physician who either unreasonably failed
to diagnose the plaintiff's ailment or failed to properly foresee or
explain the potential future consequences of the plaintiff's diagnosed illness, and thus that the physician should share the burden
of liability. Although this would not render an action time-barred,
it arguably would mitigate the actual costs to be borne by a defendant if the final result of litigation were unfavorable to him.
Martinez-Ferrerv. Richardson-Merreli, Inc.,163 presented another California appellate court with the opportunity to analyze the
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 888-89, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
Id. at 889, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
See text accompanying notes 148-149 supra.
105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980).
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reasons for postponing commencement of the limitations period.
The plaintiff, a physician, learned in 1960 that his cholestorol level
had become high and began taking MER/29 (an anti-cholesterol
drug) in March of that year. In September 1960 the plaintiff found
that he could not read. 164 He went to an opthalmologist who examined his eyes, discovered some retinal swelling (macula edema),
and suggested some possible causes of the problem. After the
plaintiff himself raised the possibility that the problem may have
been chemically induced by the MER/29, the opthalmologist told
him to discontinue taking any medications and diagnosed his condition as an "acute allergic reaction." 65 Other specialists made the
same diagnosis and " 'assumed,' " along with the plaintiff, that the
cause of his condition was the medication. Shortly after the eye
problem became apparent, the plaintiff developed severe dermatitis all over his body, which his physician concluded was " 'likely
cause[d]'" by the MEIR/29.1 66 Within four or five months the skin
disorder disappeared, and the retinal condition had improved
greatly. Intermittent eye examinations between 1961 and 1975 revealed non'further problems. In 1976, however, the plaintiff learned
that he had developed cataracts, "a permanent condition" which,
according to the plaintiff's doctor, had been caused by MEE/29.16 7
The plaintiff filed his products liability action in June 1976.168
The defendants made a motion for summary judgment claiming
that the plaintiff's action was time-barred, since the limitations period began to run "when plaintiff knew or should have known that
he ha[d] suffered injury as the probable result of MER/29, whether
or not his actual or constructive knowledge was correct." 169 The
plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that "there was no point" in
filing a claim in 1960, since he had incurred "no permanent damage or injury" as a result of his 1960 problems.' 70 The lower court
granted the -defendant's motion for summary judgment, having determined that the statute of limitations had run when the complaint was filed. 17 '
164. Id. at 318, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 592. There were two plaintiffs in this case,
Raul Martinez-Ferrer and his wife. For the purposes of the following discussion,
however, only Mr. Martinez-Ferrer's claim is relevant.
165. Id. at 319, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 320, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
169. Id. at 321, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 593 (emphasis in original).
170. Id. at 320, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
171. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol9/iss5/8

30

Sokol: Statutes of Limitations and Pollutant Injuries: The Need for a Co
1981]

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

The California Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment since triable issues of fact remained regarding the causal connection between the plaintiff's 1960 dermatitis and the MER/29 he ingested, but recognized that the real issue
on appeal was the statute-of-limitations question. 172 The court undertook a detailed analysis sensitive to the potential injustices that
rigid adherence to prior doctrine could cause "in these days of miracle drugs with their wondrous, unintended, unanticipated and frequently long-delayed side effects."' 173 Addressing the limitations
problem, the court demonstrated that allowing the plaintiff to present his claim on the merits would advance, rather than hinder,
the fundamental purposes of limitations statutes articulated by the
California Supreme Court-" 'to protect potential defendants by affording them an opportunity to gather evidence while facts are still
fresh' " and to " 'reflect . . . concern for the practical needs of
prospective plaintiffs.' "174 The court maintained that since the
defendants became aware of the "cataract-causing potential of
MER/29" in 1960 or 1961, they had ample opportunity to marshal
evidence on the topic when the facts were most fresh. 17 5 Additionally, they had twenty years to refine their research and formulate
ways to "prevent, minimize or even cure the harmIs]" bred by
MER/29.1 76 Insofar as the " 'practical needs' " of the plaintiff were
concerned, the court observed that he was "legally impotent" to
seek a substantial legal remedy (as opposed to an award of nominal
damages) until the harmful seed planted in his body in 1960, festering for sixteen years, produced an injury upon which he could
177
base a claim.
Although prior decisional law might require a holding that the
plaintiff's ingestion of MER/29 triggered but one cause of action for
172. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 322, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 594. The causation determination was crucial to the statute-of-limitations issue because if the plaintiff knew or
should have known the cause of his earlier injury in 1960, he could have and should
have sued at that point for injuries reasonably certain to occur in the future. See text
accompanying note 138 supra, note 195 infra.
173. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
174. Id. at 325, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596 (quoting Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502,
512, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 712 (1975)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 325 n.8, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596 n.8.
177. Id. at 325, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596. ""'[rhe period cannot run before the
plaintiff possesses a true cause of action, by which we mean that events have developed to a point where plaintiff is entitled to a legal remedy, not merely a symbolic
judgment such as an award of nominal damages.'" Id. (quoting Davies v. Krasna, 14
Cal. 3d 502, 513, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 712 (1975)).
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personal injuries in which recovery could be obtained for both

present damages (those incurred until trial) and reasonably predictable future damages (those determinable as the reasonably probable consequences of the injury), 178 the court believed that such a
holding would produce an unjust result in the case at hand.
Raul would have been laughed out of court had he sued for his
dermatitis and macula edema when defendants say he should
have-say in 1962-and had he then attempted to be compensated for the speculative possibility that his 1960 ingestion of
MER/29 might cause cataracts before that chance became a fact
in 1976. On the other hand, under our statutory scheme Raul
would have been quite unable to keep his cause of action alive
179
for a decade and a half.

The court reasoned that a drug manufacturer normally liable for
the long-term effects of his product should not be absolved from
that liability merely because shortly after initial ingestion "the user
suffered other, different, independent and relatively innocuous side
effects for which he did not bother to sue."18 0 Such an approach
would advance "no coherent public policy" in a modem scientific
and technological age.1 8 1 Additionally, the court analyzed various

developments indicating a trend away from strict rules against
splitting a cause of action. First, the court pointed to special limitations rules applicable to nuisance cases, observing that a plaintiff
may elect to treat a permanent nuisance as a temporary one and

bring successive claims upon it without encountering a plea of merger.182 Second, the court noted that cases involving progressive oc178. E.g., Calvin v. Thayer, 150 Cal. App. 2d 610, 310 P.2d 59 (1959); Sonbergh
v. MacQuarrie, 112 Cal. App. 2d 771, 247 P.2d 133 (1952).
179. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 323-24, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595 (citation omitted).
180. Id. at 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 326, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.2(e), Comment h (Tent. Draft No. 5 1978). Nuisance rules apply not only

to invasions of property interests, but also to personal injuries. See Nestle v. City of
Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 937-38, 496 P.2d 480, 492, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 581
(1972).
"The doctrine of res judicata . . . prevents 'splitting a cause of action' and requires all grounds upon which a single claim is based to be asserted and concluded
in one action, on pain of being barred from separate suit." C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF

FEDERAL COURTS § 78 (3d ed. 1976). "[un accordance with public policy, partially
to conserve the court's time but probably in the main to prevent the hardship upon
defendant of unnecessary piecemeal litigation, a single cause of action cannot be
split so as to be properly made the subject of different actions." 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.410[2], at 1164 (2d ed. 1980) (citing Sutcliffe Storage & Ware-
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cupational disease might indicate a trend away from strict application of merger rules.18 3 Finally, the court cited the tentative draft
of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments which states that the
general rule against splitting a cause of action will not apply where
it is clear that the policies against splitting are outweighed by an
"extraordinary reason" or the first judgment was in conflict with
the just fulfillment of a statutory or consititutional plan.18 4 Conceding that these developments in the law would not mandate a
decision favorable to the plaintiff, for he could not "wish away" the
minor problems he experienced in 1960, the court nevertheless declared that the developments cited
certainly. . . indicate which way the wind is blowing: away from
a blind adherence to rigid concepts of what constitutes a cause of
action and toward a set of rules which will enable plaintiffs to recover for just claims where that is possible without prejudice to
defendants or insult to established rules of law, such as the merger aspect of the rule of res judicata. 185
The court admitted its inability to foresee the future effects of such
an approach; it concluded, however, that to deny the plaintiff an
opportunity to present his case on the merits "would be a miscar18 6
riage of justice."'
The Martinez decision's major strengths lie in its perception of
limitations dilemmas typical of situations involving latent or progressive diseases and its suggestion that modem adjustments be
made in the laws of limitation and merger. Its most obvious weakness is that it gives relatively short shrift to the values of repose
and stability in human affairs which statutes of limitations are often
said to foster.' 8 7 If it is always true that "the right to be free of
house Co. v. United States, 162 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1947)). What constitutes a "cause
of action" for res judicata purposes cannot be defined with precision. Various tests
have emerged which aid in the determination. See, e.g., United States v. Haitian Republic, 154 U.S. 653 (1940) (will same evidence suffice to sustain both judgments);
Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927) (is same right infringed by same
wrong); Cypress Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 109 F.2d 623 (5th Cir. 1940) (is
there identity of grounds); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y.
304, 165 N.E. 456 (1929) (are actions so identical that different judgment in second
action would damage interests established by first judgment).
183. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 326, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 597 (citing Coots v. Southern
Pac. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 805, 322 P.2d 460 (1958)).
184. Id. at 327, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 597 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.2(1)(d), (f)).
185. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
186. Id.
187. See note 11 and text accompanying notes 12-17 supra. The Martinez court,
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stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute
them,"1 88 then the Martinez court sorely understated defendants'
repose interests, unless it did not view the plaintiff's claim as
"'stale." Apparently adopting the latter view, the court noted that
the plaintiff "would have been laughed out of court" had he sought
recovery in 1962 for his eye problems, dermatitis, and the "speculative possibility" of cataracts. 189 Moreover, after the plaintiff first
discovered his cataracts and their cause in 1976, he diligently filed
suit within less than a year of his discovery. 190
It is also conceivable that the court, like another court before
it, may have perceived drug companies as "unique among most potential torffeasors" regarding their "expectations of repose,"' 19 1 for
since the harmful potential of drugs often is not fully appreciated
when drugs are initially marketed, 19 2 drug "companies know or at
least should expect that some time may pass before the harmful effects of their products manifest themselves in drug users. "193 Still
more time may pass before users are able to discover a probable
causal connection between their respective injuries and the drugs
they have consumed. 19 4 Therefore, if drug manufacturers cannot
reasonably expect immunity to suit before consumers have had a
fair opportunity to discover their injuries and the probable cause of
those injuries, then the Martinez court may not have underplayed
defendants' repose interests unduly.
The discovery rule in environmental-tort litigation.-Since the

Martinez court was willing to grant the plaintiff his day in court despite the fact that there had been an earlier minor disorder, 95 a
Lathrop area resident who seeks recovery for a serious toxic-waste
however, briefly discussed the defendants' ability to marshal evidence while it was
fresh and their opportunity to refine such evidence over the years. 105 Cal. App. 3d
at 325, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
188. Upited States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
189. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
190. Id. at 319-20, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93.
191. Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 173, 371 A.2d 170, 176 (1977).
192. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
193. 117 N.H. at 174, 371 A.2d at 176 (1977).
194. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122
Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170
(1977).
195. The Martinez court categorically stated that "there would not be the
slightest difficulty in saying that Raul's cause of action is not barred by the statute of
limitations, were it not again for the relatively minor problems encountered in
1960." 105 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
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injury discovered after the statute of limitations has run should be
able to bring suit even if he or she had previously contracted a minor and temporary disorder whose origin or future progression was
unclear at the time of diagnosis. As a matter of course, the plaintiff
who sustains such a serious and permanent disorder must be diligent to determine the cause of the injury and whether he should
litigate. Likewise, he must file his claim within one year of discovering the probable cause of the disorder, making certain to properly raise the issue of belated discovery in the complaint. This does
not mean that a plaintiff should be permitted to sleep on his or her
rights until the full extent of damages caused by a permanent and
serious disease becomes manifest. Martinez-Ferrer filed suit within
a year of his discovery that the MER/29 caused his cataracts; he
did not wait for his cataracts to worsen or cause blindness before
he brought his claim. Environmental-pollution victims could be
held to a similar standard whether suing to recover for serious permanent damage sustained long after a temporary affliction whose
probable cause and future progression were earlier indeterminable,
or, for any damage, temporary or permanent, whose probable
cause and future progression are scientifically determinable at the
time of discovery.
The value of repose is substantially undercut by such an approach. Nevertheless, a useful analogy may be drawn between environmental polluters and drug manufacturers. Just as a drug's potential for harm often remains unknown to manufacturers and users
for many years after initial marketing, the potentially hazardous
consequences of environmental pollution may be unknown for
many years, perhaps even generations, after initial contamination.
Just as it may take time for the potential harm to manifest itself in
the drug user, it may take years for environmental contaminants,
acting upon unsuspecting residents, to cause ascertainable harms in
their victims. 196 And in both types of cases there may be an extended period of time before the victim discovers the injury and its
cause. The lapse may be even longer in the pollutant-injury situation, since the gravity of hazardous- and toxic-waste disposal and its
ramifications has gained considerable national attention only recently. 197 If drug manufacturers cannot reasonably expect immunity to suit before the deleterious effects of their products manifest
196. Kraus, supra note 3, at 84. See text accompanying notes 7, 42, 79 supra.
197. SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 496-97. See, e.g., Hazardous and Toxic
Waste Disposal Hearings,supra note 4; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4.
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themselves in consumers so that a causal connection between injury and product can be drawn, 198 then environmental polluters,
with knowledge or reason to know that their activities may cause
grave and long-term health effects, should not reasonably expect to
be free from the possibility of litigation before the same causal connection can be drawn between injury and polluting substance. The
argument becomes even more compelling when one realizes that in
many instances consumers may actively choose whether to purchase or ingest a particular drug. In the environmental-pollution
context, however, residents are often deprived of such choice,
since the harmful effects of pollution may remain hidden until long
after the initial purchase of a home and regular use of necessities
such as drinking water. 199
Given California's relatively liberal approach to limitations periods where latent and progressive injuries are involved, it is likely
that plaintiffs who sustain damages stemming from the Lathrop
plant's disposal of toxic wastes will be able to try their cases on the
merits in California courts. This, of course, is contingent upon
their ability to properly raise the issue of belated discovery in their
complaints. Foreign jurisdictions would do well to adopt the
California approach to the statute of limitations, since statutes of
limitations which begin to run only when the injured party is able
or should reasonably be able to ascertain a causal connection between the injury and exposure to an environmental hazard are
highly sensitive to the special handicaps posed by the latency of so
many potential toxic-pollutant injuries. Such an approach is especially useful, since environmental injuries are often characterized
by unknown or indeterminate causation. 200
Plaintiffs cannot be expected to do something so illogical as to
file suits before they are aware of their injuries and the causes of
those injuries. In addition, they need not be required to bear all,
or even many, of the costs of improper waste disposal-costs which
good sense and equity require be borne primarily by those who introduce dangerous contaminants into the environment. Defendants, in turn, need to be encouraged to keep more accurate rec198. See text accompanying notes 191-194 supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
200. Estep, supra note 3, at 266-67, 269-75; Kraus, supra note 3, at 94-96. "The
long latency period, the cumulative effect, the increased mobility of modem society,
and the persistence of many of these chemicals in the environment and the food
chain make accurate identification of a cause-and-effect relationship highly improbable." Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted).
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ords of their disposal activities and to adopt a significantly higher

standard of care in the disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes. This
is not too much to exact from those whose conduct creates environmental hazards of considerable magnitude. The law, as a policy
matter, should not insulate environmental polluters from the inconvenience of delayed litigation and the prospects of liability and
compensation of innocent victims where their negligence can be
firmly established in the courtroom. The courts should not permit
such an unconscionable result, especially where the costs are imposed not only on a personal, individual level but on a social level
as well.
The California judiciary, if the Velasquez and Martinez cases
are any indication, recognizes the dilemma of the plaintiff with a
latent injury, and public policy and good sense dictate that it extend its liberal application of the discovery rule to the area of
environmental-tort litigation.
Petrochemical Contamination of Cohansey Aquifer,
Dover Township, New Jersey
The Union Carbide Corporation is engaged in the manufacture
of organic chemicals, plastics and resins at a plant in Bound Brook,
New Jersey. 20 1 The manufacturing process results in the production of various chemical wastes such as aromatic hydrocarbons,
benzene, toluene, styrene, xylene, ketone, alchohols, trichlorethylene, acrylonitrile and phenolic resins.202 The Environmental Protection Agency has determined that many of the wastes enumerated above are hazardous due to their toxicity to human or aquatic
life, their reactivity to other chemicals, and their flammable and irritant properties. 20 3 Medical research has revealed that phenol not
204
only promotes tumor growth, but also has mutagenic effects.
20
5
Acrylonitrile and trichlorethylene are carcinogenic substances.
Between March and December 1971 Union Carbide disposed
201.

SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 343.

202. NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, INTERIM REPORT-INVESTIGATION OF GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION, PLEASANT PLAINS SECTION OF DOVER TOWNSHIP, OCEAN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY 3 (1974).

203.

SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 343.

204. Id. (citing Heller & Pursell, Phenol-ContaminatedWaters and Their PhysiologicalAction, 63 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPY 99 (1938)).
205. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 343 (citing Davis & Rail, "Estimating
Risks as the Basis for Preventive Policies," in STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
(Ng & Davis eds. 1981).
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of at least 5000-6000 barrels of chemical waste. A scavenger trucker
under contract to Union Carbide disposed of approximately 4500 of
those barrels on a farm in Dover Township between August and
December 1971. Although the trucker scattered a majority of the
drums around the farm, he poured a portion of the wastes directly
into the ground. He dumped the remainder of the barreled wastes
produced between March and December 1971 in the Dover Township landfill, notwithstanding the fact that the landfill was not approved for liquid-chemical-waste disposal. Early in 1972 the New
Jersey Supreme Court ordered Union Carbide and its trucker to
stop the dumping and to remove the wastes disposed on the farm.
The removal operation revealed that approximately ten percent of
the Union Carbide barrels were partially or completely empty. The
E.P.A. determined that their contents may have been discharged
into the farm's ground or into neighboring property. 20 6
Toxic-waste disposal by Union Carbide has resulted in groundwater contamination which could adversely affect a substantial
number of Southern New Jersey residents. The first indications of
groundwater contamination appeared in early 1974, when commercial lab tests revealed traces of toluene and phenols in water
samples taken from wells situated near the Dover Township
landfill. 20 7 Subsequent tests conducted in 1974 by various state and
federal agencies confirmed the findings of toluene and disclosed
the presence of styrene and carbon tetrachloride in water samples
extracted from the contaminated areas. 208 Other specific contaminants may well have been present, but tests could not distinguish
them from others already isolated.20 9 As a result of these findings
and unsuccessful attempts to ameliorate the water problem, 148
wells were officially condemned by health authorities by 1977210
and were sealed by their owners. 2 11
Results of a 1974 "illness survey" conducted by the Disease
Control Section of the Ocean County Health Department indicate
that 15 of 23 families interviewed reported kidney, stomach, liver,
or gall bladder illnesses. Eight families reported no illnesses. The
survey provided no correlation between the consumption of contaminated water and illness, since discomfort was reported by fami206. SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 343-45.
207. Id. at 345.
208. Id. at 347-48, 352.
209. Id. at 346-47.
210. Id. at 349.
211. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 354.
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lies with contaminated wells, those with uncontaminated wells, and
those with wells for which no testing data were available. 212 Children of one family who had suffered body rashes, however, found
that the rashes disappeared once they stopped using well-water.213
Although many of the laboratory tests used to examine various
contaminated water samples did not specifically isolate undesirable organic chemicals present in the groundwater-and thus determination of the full range of health effects is speculative-some
contaminants in the groundwater have been identified as styrene,
phenol, carbon tetrachloride, and toluene. 214 As of 1977, the National Academy of Sciences had no data on the carcinogenic,
mutagenic, or teratogenic properties of styrene and toluene; 215 nevertheless, it is entirely possible that medical research may reveal
links between such devastating properties and these substances.
Phenol and carbon tetrachloride, on the other hand, have been
linked to serious disorders: Phenol promotes tumor growth and is a
known mutagen, 216 while carbon tetrachloride is carcinogenic, pos217
sibly mutagenic, and causes liver and kidney problems.
Application of the discovery rule.-The New Jersey personalinjury statute of limitations requires that a plaintiff file suit within
218
two years of the day that his or her cause of action accrues.
Taken in its strictest sense-where the limitations period begins
when the defendant commits the act complained of-such a statute
would bar the claim of a plaintiff who, through no fault of his or
her own, was unaware of the tort or injury until more than two
years after exposure to the defendant's alleged misconduct. Cognizant, however, that rigid adherence to a strict rule of accrual would
operate harshly against plaintiffs blamelessly ignorant of their
causes of action, the New Jersey courts have sanctioned relatively
liberal application of the discovery rule.2 19 The New Jersey formu212. Id. at 354-55.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 345-48.
215. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DRINKING WATER AND HEALTH 765,
772-73 (1977).
216. SIx CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, at 355.
217. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CHLOROFORM, CARBON TETRACELORIDE, AND OTHER HALOMETHANES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 274-75

(1978).

218. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1952).
219. See, e.g., Moran v. Napolitano, 71 NJ. 133, 363 A.2d 346 (1976) (discovery
rule applied to medical malpractice case where plaintiff alleged negligent
misdiagnosis and treatment); Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341
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lation of the rule provides that "in an appropriate case a cause of
action will be held not to accrue until the injured party discovers,
or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should
have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable
claim." 22 0 In other words, the plaintiff must know that he or she
has been injured and that the injury is attributable to the fault of
22
another. 1
The New Jersey Supreme Court described the discovery rule's
use and operation in Lopez v. Swyer, 222 a medical-malpractice
claim in which the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries allegedly
sustained as a result of negligent radiation treatment. Following a
radical mastectomy for breast cancer the plaintiff underwent radiation therapy administered by Dr. Swyer, a radiologist, from early
January to mid-February 1962. The plaintiff suffered "calamitous"
side-effects including severe bums, constant pain and nausea,
necrotic ulcers, pulmonary radiation fibrosis, and spontaneous rib
fractures. 2 23 In March 1967, while hospitalized for reconstructive
surgery, the plaintiff overheard her examining physician make remarks which she alleged first alerted her to the possibility that the
radiologist had been negligent in 1962. The plaintiff filed suit
against Dr. Swyer in mid-September 1967, alleging inter alia that
he had been negligent in administering the radiation treatments of
1962. Recognizing that New Jersey's two-year personal-injury statute of limitations might preclude her from presenting her claim on
the merits, the plaintiff urged that the discovery rule be applied to
postpone commencement of the limitations period until March
1967, when she allegedly first suspected that Dr. Swyer had been
2
negligent. 2
Holding that a material issue of fact as to the date the plaintiff

(1976) (discovery rule applied to case involving negligent post-operative care and
treatment); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) (discovery rule applied
to medical-malpractice claim where plaintiff sought recovery for negligent radiation
treatment).
220. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272, 300 A.2d 563, 565 (1973).
221. Alfone v. Sarno, 139 N.J. Super. 518, 354 A.2d 654 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976); Lawrence R. McCoy Co. v. S.S. Theomitor, 133 N.J. Super. 308, 336 A.2d 80
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). Knowledge that there might be a relationship between
the injury and the defendant's conduct, however, is not the equivalent of knowledge
of an actionable claim against the defendant. Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534
F.2d 566, 575 (3d Cir. 1976).
222. 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973).
223. Id. at 271, 300 A.2d at 565.
224. Id.
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discovered or should have discovered the link between her injury
and the malpractice precluded summary judgment for the radiologist on statute of limitations grounds, the court proceeded to
trace the development of the discovery rule, noting that its relevance had been acknowledged "whenever equity and jiu.stice have
seemed to call for its application."2 25 Nevertheless, the court explained, in keeping with the defendant-protective policies underlying statutes of limitation, courts should identify, evaluate, and
weigh the equities of both parties to the lawsuit before relaxing the
statute of limitations. 2 26 In balancing the claims of an aggrieved
plaintiff against those of a defendant compelled to defend an action
out of time, the court explained that all relevant facts and circumstances including but not limited to the following should be considered:
The nature of the alleged injury, the availability of witnesses and
written evidence, the length of time that has elapsed since the
alleged wrongdoing, whether the delay has been to any extent
deliberate or intentional, whether the delay may be said to have
peculiarly or unusually prejudiced the defendant. 227
Further evincing a scrupulous regard for defendants' interests, the
court explained that the plaintiff must establish that the discovery
rule should be applied and determined that judges should decide
22 8
whether the plaintiff has met that burden.
22 9
Yet in a subsequent case, Fox v. Passaic General Hospital,
the New Jersey Supreme Court saw no reason to require a plaintiff
to bring her action any more expeditiously after belated discovery
than she would have had she sustained ascertainable injuries at the
time the wrong was committed. 2 30 The justifications advanced in
support of this proposition were characterized by the court as "convenient as well as logical." 2 31 First, since under the discovery rule
a plaintiff's claim does not accrue until discovery of the injury complained of, as a matter of principle the plaintiff should have the full
statutory period within which to file a claim just as he or she has

225. Id. at 273, 300 A.2d at 566. The court also held that availability of the discovery rule to a plaintiff was a question for the court, not the jury. Id.
226. Id. at 274, 300 A.2d at 567.
227. Id. at 276, 300 A.2d at 568.
228. Id. at 274-76, 300 A.2d at 567-68.
229. 71 N.J. 122, 363 A.2d 341 (1976).
230. Id. at 125-26, 363 A.2d at 343.
231. Id.
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when discovery and the actionable conduct occur simultaneously. 2 32 Furthermore, judicial determination of the precise point at

which a plaintiff must file suit after belated discovery would be unduly difficult and could yield uncertain, illogical results. 233 Apparently, the court is as determined to protect a plaintiff's interest in
sufficient time to make an intelligent decision regarding litigation
as it is to guard a defendant's interest in repose. Yet since allowing
plaintiffs two years from discovery in which to commence their actions may pose hardships on defendants compelled to defend
against untimely claims, a defendant may successfully invoke the
statute-of-limitations defense if he or she can establish (1) that the
lapse of time between the expiration of two years after the wrong
and the date the suit was filed peculiarly prejudices him or her;
and (2) that there was reasonable time for the plaintiff to institute
his or her action between discovery of his or her cause of action
and the expiration of two years after the initial wrong. 23 4 By defini-

tion, the prejudice rule set forth above applies only where the
plaintiff discovers her cause of action within two years of the defendant's actionable conduct. 235 The effect of prejudice to the de-

fendant where the cause of action is discovered over two years
after the defendant's wrongful conduct remains a factor to be considered among others when balancing the equities of both parties. 238
In keeping with the principal policy consideration embodied in
statutes of limitation-faimess to the defendant-and the equitable
nature of the discovery rule, not every belated discovery justifies
application of the discovery doctrine. Burd v. New Jersey Tele-

phone Co. 2 37 illustrates this proposition. The plaintiff in Burd was

a laborer whose work mainly consisted of gluing together pieces of
plastic pipe in a narrow, unventilated trench. 238 The plaintiff had
used the same glue on two prior jobs and had been using it for two
days prior to his heart attack. Having read the label on the glue,
which advised against inhaling the product's fumes, the plaintiff
nevertheless used the glue under conditions that made it impossi232.
233.
234.
dice.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 128, 363 A.2d at 343-44. The Fox court did not define peculiar prejuId. at 128 n.2, 363 A.2d at 344 n.2 .
The Fox court specifically did not decide the issue of the effect of preju-

dice to defendant where the cause of action is discovered later, but rather left it
"subject to... Lopez" for consideration in a later case. Id.
237. 149 N.J. Super. 20, 372 A.2d 1355 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
238. Id. at 24, 372 A.2d at 1356.
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ble for him to heed the instructions.2 39 He regularly felt dizzy
about one and a half hours after starting to use the glue, but the
dizziness always subsided approximately one hour after he finished
working. On September 7, 1971, however, the plaintiff stopped
working in the early afternoon due to dizziness and pains in his upper body. That afternoon he went to the hospital where his condition was diagnosed as a heart attack. The plaintiff left the hospital
at the end of September but returned on October 12, 1971, after
suffering another heart attack.2 40 The court, rejecting the plaintiff's
argument that he first learned of a possible connection between the
glue and his heart attack in October 1972 during a conversation
with his attorney, held that the claim,
filed in May 1974, was
24 1
barred by the statute of limitations.

The court's decision was based upon a variety of factors. First
the court observed that the plaintiff was aware of his injury on September 7, 1971, and noted the absence of a relationship between
the plaintiff and defendants which would reasonably "lull [the]
plaintiff into sleeping on his rights."2 42 Further, there was no indication that the defendants had concealed any possible liability from
the plaintiff, Additionally,the court attributed significance to the
plaintiff's pre-accident and post-accident knowledge of the product's warning against inhalation of fumes, and the unpleasant side
effects he regularly suffered while using the glue, which subsided3
24
approximately one hour after he left his place of employment.
All of these elements appear to have influenced the court's decision
that the plaintiff should have known that he had a possible basis for
an actionable claim on the date of his heart attack .2 4 At the very

least, the court declared, "from the moment of his heart attack,
plaintiff should have been on inquiry as to the possible causes
thereof, and taken appropriate steps to ascertain them."2 45 Burd
can serve as a reminder to less than diligent plaintiffs that prior ap246
plication of the discovery rule "whenever equity and justice"
239. Id. at 25, 372 A.2d at 1357. The plaintiff worked in an unventilated trench
5 feet deep and 18 inches wide. Id. at 24, 372 A.2d at 1356. One of the plaintiff's expert witnesses, a chemical engineer and toxicologist, opined that wind "would not
be a significant factor in a 5' deep trench." Id. at 26, 372 A.2d at 1358.
240. Id. at 24, 372 A.2d at 1357.
241. Id. at 24-25, 28-29, 32, 372 A.2d at 1359, 1362.
242. Id. at 33, 372 A.2d at 1361.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 34, 372 A.2d at 1362.
245. Id. at 33, 372 A.2d at 1361.
246. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 273, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (1973).
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have required it does not guarantee its automatic application in every case. Where circumstances permit the suggestion that a plaintiff may have knowingly slept on his rights, invocation of the discovery rule will not be easy.
The effect of the New Jersey statute of limitations and discovery rule on the potential ability of Dover Township residents to recover damages for latent injuries caused by petrochemical well contamination is difficult to assess. Considerations of fairness to both
parties might lead a court to conclude that requiring a polluter to
defend itself years after the wrongdoing would be inequitable. If
this were to occur, latent injuries would not be recompensed. Nevertheless, it is equally possible that the courts will not bar actions
for latent medical injuries if the evidence indicates that a plaintiff
had neither knowledge nor reason to know of his right to compensation for such injuries until two years prior to instituting his claim.

A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: A UNIFORM TOXIC SUBSTANCES
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The problems incident to toxic waste disposal have only begun
to emerge, and future generations doubtless will continue to face
them. Lawyers have predicted that diseases allegedly caused by exposure to toxic substances present in industrial waste dumps may
bring about a flood of litigation in the coming years. 24 7 The profession has also agreed that the legal system has been forced to fashion new methods of dealing with latent disease, although some attorneys have suggested that "latent disease suits are pushing the
tort system beyond its limits" 24 8 and may threaten the national
economy. 2 49 It must be remembered, however, that latent or progressive disease cases differ from the usual tort case in which a
plaintiff knows that he has been injured, when the injury occurred,
247. Podgers, supra note 110, at 140. In SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 3, however, the committee concluded that "[ejffects that cannot be seen, diseases that are
not manifest, susceptibility that cannot be detected-these are matters that are much
less likely to result in lawsuits than accidents that make immediate and tangible
physical injury or property destruction." Id. at 497. Also noted is that aggrieved parties "may encounter resistance from. . . [Ilawyers unacquainted with what little
toxic substances injury law does exist [who] may be discouraging about the prospects
of recovery." Id. These and other factors "combine to discourage the initiation of potentially legitimate claims, and to promote settlement that may not provide adequate
compensation." Id. If this study, prepared by the Environmental Law Institute, is
correct, then the proverbial "floodgates of litigation" argument against application of
the discovery rule to latent environmental-injury cases loses much of its strength.
248. Podgers, supra note 110, at 141.
249. Id. at 139-42.
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and who is legally accountable to him. 2 50
The reaction of many potential defendants to the devastating
problems attributable to hazardous and toxic wastes and their regulation has been less than cooperative. In response to the news that
regulations purporting to police the disposal of hazardous and toxic
wastes "from the cradle to the grave" were imminent, 2 51 "cut-rate,
no-questions-asked disposal services . . . offered by shady operators . . . often suspected of having connections with organized
crime" 252 sprang up around the country to facilitate dumping
before the federal waste monitoring system took effect on November 19, 1980.253 Thousands of tons of hazardous and toxic wastes
were dumped into sewer systems, onto highways, and in abandoned
shopping center lots "in a last-minute rush to dispose of the
254
chemicals."
The time is ripe for special limitations legislation embodying
both the traditional policy of repose and current awareness that the
harms wrought by environmental pollution may not become ascertainable until years, perhaps even decades or generations, after a
potential plaintiff's initial exposure to substances generated as a
consequence of hazardous or toxic waste disposal. A uniform toxic
substances statute of limitations would reconcile the inconsistencies
of treatment in states such as New York, California, and New Jersey and avoid the flagrant injustices which disparities of treatment
in this area would undoubtedly engender. The uniform act proposed here attempts to adopt the best features of the discovery
rule as applied in jurisdictions such as New Jersey and California
and minimize the possibilities of disparate treatment. While it directs that accrual be defined flexibly to avoid penalizing an otherwise diligent plaintiff for blameless delay in bringing a claim, it also
safeguards the fundamental repose interest embodied in statutes of
limitations.
Proposed Uniform Toxic Substances Statute of Limitations

§ 1 Accrual, Injury, Discovery of Injury and Likely

Cause

(a) The statute of limitations shall commence to run upon the date
that the plaintiff's cause of action shall have accrued. "Accrual" shall
250. See id. at 140.

251.

Marcus, Toxic Waste: A Legal Mess, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10, 1980, at 1, col. 3.

New regulations became effective on Nov. 19, 1980, which provide for federal monitoring of hazardous wastes. 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-265 (1980).

252.
fect, N.Y.
253.
254.

Knight, Toxic Wastes Hurriedly Dumped Before New Law Goes into EfTimes, Nov. 16, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 5, 28, col. 4.
Id.
Id. at 28, col. 4.
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be interpreted to mean the point at which a plaintiff discovered or
reasonably should have discovered his or her latent or progressive injury and the likelihood of causal link between such injury and the
polluting conduct of the defendant.
(b) "Injury" shall mean a latent or progressive disorder of a permanent nature rather than a minor, temporary disorder 55 causing no
substantial physical and/or monetary damage to the plaintiff. Nevertheless, a plaintiff may not postpone commencement of suit until the
full extent of permanent damage becomes manifest. Instead, he must
exercise diligence in filing his claim within one year of the date that
the first indications of such permanent disorder are ascertainable to a
physician exercising reasonable care in the diagnosis of plaintiff's condition.
Comment: This provision is designed to induce plaintiffs to
promptly seek informed medical opinions when physical discomfort
becomes apparent so that disease can be diagnosed as early as possible. This, in turn, will help safeguard defendants' interests in repose.
(c) A plaintiff's discovery must be informed discovery, such as may be
obtained through medical examination and consultation.
Comment: A plaintiff's mere speculation that he has been injured
by the acts of a defendant shall not be deemed discovery within
the meaning of this act. The proffered definition of discovery, however, shall not allow a plaintiff to await an unequivocal medical determination of the causal connection between his injury and the
polluting conduct of a defendant. If, however, such a connection has
already been established and accepted within the general scientific
community and is readily determinable through standard testing apparatus when the plaintiff ascertains his disorder, when the plaintiff
may await such a medical determination of the link between the hazardous or toxic substance and the disorder complained of provided
that he has sought such a medical determination within six months of
the first ascertainable indication of injury. The policy underlying this
approach is defendant-protective in that a plaintiff shall not be
permitted to sit idly by and await scientific discovery of a causal link

255. This concept of injury is inspired by the California Court of Appeals' approach in Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal.

Rptr. 591 (1980). There the court recognized that a plaintiff who had been afflicted
with a minor, temporary disorder in 1960 "would have been laughed out of court"

had he sought compensation for "the speculative possibility" that his 1960 ingestion
of a drug might cause a more serious, permanent condition before that chance materialized into a fact in 1976. Id. at 323-24, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595. This recognition ap-

pears to have stemmed from the court's observation that the plaintiff could not have
kept his cause of action alive for ten and a half years under California's statutory
scheme. The provision here proposed adopts the California court's view of latent
harm and the rationale underlying that court's approach.
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between his disorder and a hazardous substance before he files a
claim.
Comment: Where the medical effects of hazardous or toxic substances have not been conclusively determined, the point of discovery shall be marked by the plaintiff's suspicion or reasonably
imputed suspicion that a strong causal connection exists between his
injury and the polluting conduct of another. "Suspicion or reasonably
imputed suspicion" is intended to apply to situations including but
not limited to those in which a plaintiff is aware or should have been
aware that others in his immediate geographical vicinity or in his line
of employment exposed to the same hazardous or toxic substances
have suffered harms similar to those of which he or she complains.

§ 2 Limitations of Time Within Which to File Suit
(a) A plaintiff shall have a period of one year from the date of belated
discovery to institute suit against the defendant, subject to an outside
limit of twenty years computed from the date of the conduct complained of and subject to subdivision (b) of this section.
Comment: This provision applies both to plaintiffs entitled to
await unequivocal medical findings of causation as described in § 1
and to plaintiffs who are not entitled to the benefit of such a determination. This formulation is designed to induce expeditious action on
the part of plaintiffs seeking redress for latent injuries allegedly
caused by exposure to harmful pollutant substances and to promote
administrative expediency. In addition, by setting a maximum limitations period of twenty years computed from the date of defendant's
actionable conduct this provision embodies the ever-present concern
that a defendant is entitled to some measure of repose.
(b) Where the plaintiff is a victim of genetic mutation or other disease which manifests itself in the next generation after initial exposure, and discovery is deemed to have occurred at birth or during
the plaintiff's minority, he shall have one year from the date of his
eighteenth birthday to file a claim against a defendant, provided that
his parents or other relatives or guardians with standing have not already instituted suit on his behalf within one year of discovering his
injury and its likely cause.
Comment: This provision is designed to comport with current legal principles tolling commencement of the limitations period until
an infant is capable of bringing an action on his own behalf, provided
of course, that someone with standing has not already brought a
claim on behalf of such infant. 256 This provision encourages diligence
on the part of potential plaintiffs to determine the source of genetic

256. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1229-31.
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mutation or other disease first ascertainable one generation after exposure to harmful pollutant substances. The limit of one year from
the injured party's majority is designed to preserve the repose interest as much as possible in situations of this nature.
§ 3 Burdens of Production and Persuasion
(a) The plaintiff who invokes the discovery rule to counter a defensive plea by his adversary that the action is time-barred under state
law has the burdens of raising and providing belated discovery and
persuading the court that such belated discovery was reasonable and
beyond the plaintiff's control.
(b) In order to raise the issue of belated discovery a plaintiff must
state the following in his complaint:
(i) when exposure to the toxic substance occurred and under
what circumstances;
(ii) when discovery of injury took place;
(iii) the circumstances surrounding discovery;
(iv) facts which show that failure to make an earlier discovery
was reasonable, justifiable, and not a result of the plaintiffs
indolence in failing to investigate or to act.
Failure to allege the foregoing will leave the plaintiff vulnerable to
the general rule of accrual as defined by the state in which the claim
arose.
§ 4 Role of the Court
(a) The court must identify, evaluate, and weigh the equities of both
parties in determining whether or not to apply the appropriate discovery standard set forth in either § 2(a) or (b) of this act.
(b) In balancing the claims of an aggrieved plaintiff against those of a
defendant compelled to defend an action out of time, the court must
consider all the relevant facts and circumstances, including, but not
limited to the following:
(i) nature of the alleged injury;
(ii) availability of witnesses and written evidence;
(iii) time lapse between exposure and commencement of suit;
(iv) whether the delay has been to any extent intentional;
(v) whether the delay may be said to have peculiarly prejudiced
the defendant. Prejudice does not mean inconvenience to defendant's counsel in adducing evidence, for this burden is
equally cast upon the plaintiff.

This is an unorthodox approach to an untraditional problem.
Admittedly, this proposal spins its own web of legal issues which

ultimately must be grappled with and resolved through judicial interpretation. However, it provides an alternative which does justice to the principles of tort law and does not run afoul of the un-
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derlying reasons for statutes of limitations-namely, to promote the
timely assertion of claims by plaintiffs on notice of invasion of their
legal rights and the injuries caused by such invasion. The uniform
act here proposed does not unusually prejudice potential defendants, nor does it give plaintiffs an unwarranted windfall. A defendant is not subject to indeterminate liability. In addition, the burden of adducing evidence regarding the circumstances of exposure
to toxic substances and their possible injurious effects, if any, falls
with equal weight on both parties. In fact, the plaintiff will often
have a greater burden since free and ready access to various records of hazardous- and toxic-waste disposal prepared by the defendant polluter is unlikely even in the process of discovery. Moreover, the plaintiff carries the burden of persuading the trier of fact
not only that the defendant was negligent, but also that the defendant's negligence caused his injuries-not an easy feat since the
types of chemicals we encounter regularly may be as much the
cause of harm as toxic wastes pumped into the environment by
various entities. 25 7 If present statutes of limitations are to be interpreted restrictively so that future environmental-tort personal injury claims are barred, and if defendants need never mount a vigorous defense against such claims, then there will be no incentive
for those engaged in toxic-waste disposal to raise their standards of
care for the sake of environmental safety and public health. Similarly, if defendants are to assume no responsibility for the belated
consequences of their acts, our judicial system could suffer a tremendous loss of public favor and confidence in its legitimacy. The
act proposed, or one similar in underlying purpose, could avoid
such unfortunate results.
CONCLUSION

There is a need for critical evaluation and reformulation of
statutes of limitations-defenses entrenched in public policy that
should not be ignored by the courts, yet defenses that should be
protected from abuse at the hands of unscrupulous defendants and
from unthinking application to cases where diligent plaintiffs may
reasonably fail to bring timely suits. Strict adherence to statutory
limitations periods and automatic deference by the courts to
various legislatures will often deprive those victimized by toxicsubstances contamination of any relief, regardless of the merits of
their claims. Dissimilar treatment of statutes of limitations and
257. Kraus, supra note 3, at 96.
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rules of accrual across the board only adds to the confusion of a
very complicated legal area. The situation as it stands now will, if
unchanged, inevitably breed glaring inequities of treatment. A
plaintiff stricken by a serious latent disorder or genetic mutation
filing suit out of time might not recover a cent in New York even
if the causal link between his harm and the defendant's polluting
activities were firmly established; someone filing out of time across
the Hudson River or in California, however, might recover money
damages even if he had nothing more than a skin rash. Such disparate results are clearly unfair and provide little hope that victims of
pollutant injury will be adequately compensated.
This Note does not advocate court adoption of a "deep
pockets" policy of basing liability on the ability of various defendants to compensate those afflicted by latent or progressive injuries. Instead, it proposes that liability be based upon causation
rather than predetermined by statute of limitations. Desperately
needed is a humane legislative plan which will not attach adverse
consequences to blameless ignorance and inaction on the part of
plaintiffs and which will ensure uniform treatment of latent and
progressive injury victims. Until such legislation is enacted, the
courts must safeguard the special interests in public health, environmental safety, and the integrity of the judicial system.
Michelle Sokol
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